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# SOPHISTRY UNMASKED!

A

## REFUTATION

OF THE

ARGUMENTS CONTAINED IN A PAMPHLET,

WRITTEN AND PUBLISHED

BY JOHN BRINDLEY,

ENTITLED

“A REPLY TO THE INFIDELITY AND ATHEISM  
OF SOCIALISM,”

AND PURPORTING TO BE A “JUDICIOUS SUMMARY,” OF THE EVIDENCES

OF NATURAL THEOLOGY AND REVEALED RELIGION.

---

BY JAMES NAPIER BAILEY.

---

“Heavens! if our ancient vigour were not fled,  
Could” Brindley’s prose “be written? or be read?”  
*Prose?* “that’s the mellow fruit of toil intense,  
Inspired by genius and informed by sense;  
*This*, the abortive progeny of pride  
And dulness, gentle pair, for aye allied;  
Begotten without thought, born without pains,  
The ropy drivel of rheumatic brains.”

GIFFORD’S BAVIAD.

**Leeds:**

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AND ALL BOOKSELLERS.

—  
1841.



## SOPHISTRY UNMASKED!

Having attentively perused a pamphlet entitled "a Reply to the Infidelity and Atheism of Socialism" written by *John Brindley*, speech maker to the Bishop of Exeter \* &c; we feel it a duty incumbent upon us, to take up the pen in defence of those principles we conscientiously believe to be true; and for the purpose of exposing the fallacy of the arguments contained in the aforesaid publication. We agree with Mr. Brindley, that the subject is of great importance to the human race; and that "it requires more space for its due consideration than these pages afford." We hope therefore that every person who may happen to peruse these remarks, will pay the greatest attention to the arguments advanced by Mr. Brindley; and also to the refutation of those arguments we now offer to the public.

We desire the reader to bear in mind, that Mr. Brindley, in the title page of his publication, pledges himself to prove :—

"1st. That there is in man an immaterial and immortal soul.

"2nd. That there *must, of necessity, exist* a personal and intelligent God.

"3rd. That the Christian religion is of divine origin—is strictly in accordance with the laws of our nature—and productive of more real benefit to man, than any system of human contrivance that ever has been or ever can be offered to the world : and

"Lastly, that there exists a greater amount of solid evidence to confirm the truth and reality of the facts recorded in the Christian scriptures, than can be produced in favour of the historical relations of by-gone years."

In fulfilment of the promise thus voluntarily given to the public, Mr. Brindley writes and publishes—what?—a series of elaborately written volumes, full of learning and sound argument?—no! but a paltry pamphlet in demy 12mo, containing only sixty-eight pages, embracing,—not the thoughts and reasonings of John Brindley, but of other and more illustrious writers, and filled with every variety of fallacy and sophism from end to end. This vain, pedantic, and unfulfilled promise, is alone sufficient to shew that Mr. Brindley is either defective in learning and judgment, and therefore incompetent to fulfill his promise; or that he is a mere boaster whose mind is inflated with intellectual pride: for no man however, vast may be his powers, can present to the world in the compass of sixty-eight pages, a summary of the arguments which may be advanced, and which have been advanced, in favour of the propositions, the truth of which Mr. Brindley has undertaken to prove.

\* "I now feel it as much my duty, as it is my gratification, to say by letter, that I feel on all grounds, public and private, but especially on public, very sincere gratitude for the noble exertions which you have made in the cause of which I have been comparatively a very inefficient supporter. It was your able, fearless, and indefatigable zeal which furnished almost all the means of which I availed myself in the attempt to bring the case before parliament. I shall have pleasure in repeating this declaration whenever it be necessary.

"H. EXETER.

"J. BRINDLEY, ESQ."

"See also his Lordship's speech in the House of Lords, January, 1840."

Quoted from a handbill headed "Socialism Unmasked," containing a collection of testimonials as to Mr. Brindley's character, abilities, &c., printed at Chester, and published by Mr. Brindley, as a specimen of his *extreme modesty*.

We request the reader of these pages to bear in mind also, that Mr. Brindley pledges himself to prove the truth of the first, third, and fourth of the general propositions to be found on the title page of his work : but with respect to the second proposition, he assumes a haughtier tone, and more commanding attitude. He does not merely undertake to prove *relatively* to his readers, that a "personal and intelligent God" exists; but he undertakes to prove that a "*personal and intelligent God must, of NECESSITY, exist.*" This is neither more nor less than *undertaking to demonstrate* the existence of a personal and intelligent Deity. This mighty work Mr. Brindley solemnly promises to perform; and this we request the reader to bear in mind while he examines with us the varied arguments adduced by the author of the "Reply."

The first position which Mr. Brindley endeavours to establish is, that Socialism is "really an infidel and atheistical system."

At page the first he says :—

"That Socialism really is an infidel and atheistical system, and that we are not fighting a shadow of our own creation, will be abundantly proved by the following decisive statement of Robert Owen, the Founder and President of the system.

"I undertake to prove that all the religions of the world have been founded on the ignorance of mankind; that they are directly opposed to the never changing laws of our nature; that they have been and are the real source of vice, disunion, and misery of every description".—*Owen's challenge to the Clergy of New Orleans.*

This passage is brought forward to prove that *Socialism* is really an infidel system.

The term *Infidel* is generally used by Christians in a reproachful and invidious sense. In popular acceptation, it denotes a person who dissents from the religious opinions of a particular party. The word *Infidelis*, from which the term *Infidel* is derived, signifies *unfaithful, disloyal, false*; and used as a substantive by Ecclesiastics, it means an unbeliever or infidel to their faith. Now in the latter acceptation the Socialists may with propriety be called *infidels*, and some parts of their system may be termed infidel also. They dissent in many respects from the orthodox professors of christianity, and are therefore infidels to the faith of those from whom they dissent. But they are justified in calling those infidels who dissent from them, by the same principle of reasoning which justifies the Christian in applying the epithet to the Socialists. In the same way the Mahommedan is justified in calling the follower of Christ an infidel, because the follower of Christ is not a believer in the Mahommedan creed. In short every person entertaining a particular creed or system of religious opinions, may with propriety denominate every other person who dissents from that creed an "*infidel*"

But the term *infidel*, as we have before remarked, is generally used in an invidious and reproachful sense. The understandings of men have been so wrought upon by the craft and cunning of priests, that they are easily led to conclude that infidelity is the synonym of immorality and unrighteousness. Their hopes and fears have been alternately excited by the delusive and terrific visions of priestly portraiture; and this, combined with their strong faith in the fallacious doctrine which teaches the necessary connection between religion and virtue, leads them to conclude that a man who conscientiously adopts, and as conscientiously expresses, opinions different to those they entertain, must be a bad, unholy, and immoral character. The priests, ever crafty, perceiving this tendency of popular opinion, employ the term infidel for the purpose of prejudicing the public mind against the person to whom it

is applied. For this purpose it is used by the *erudite* Mr. Brindley in his "Reply."

Though we freely admit that the words "*infidels*" and *infidelity* may with propriety be employed by Christians to denote Socialists, and some of the doctrines of Socialism, we contend nevertheless that the frequent use of this epithet, arises from an uncandid disposition, a heartless recklessness of feeling, and a paltry, ignoble, and unholy motive.

The opponents of Socialism feel peculiarly hurt, and wince, and sneer, and shrug their shoulders, whenever the term *irrational* is applied to them, because the term "*irrational*" is generally applied to persons who are considered unreasonable, rash, or ignorant. But surely it is as improper for Christians to call Socialists *infidels*, as it is for Socialists to call Christians *irrational*. In the generality of cases both parties may with great propriety apply the terms to each other; nevertheless it would be better for both parties to drop the use of ambiguous and abusive epithets, which in the present state of popular opinion, tend only to irritate the feelings, arouse prejudice, and steel the mind against the reception of truth.

Though we admit, however, that many parts of the system of Socialism are at variance with the religious opinions of Christians, yet we contend that Mr. Brindley has not proved Socialism to be an infidel system by the passage he has quoted from Mr. Owen's challenge to the clergy of New Orleans. That passage simply expresses what Mr. Owen undertook to do at a particular time and in a particular place, but has no reference to what he has done since at other times and in other places, nor does it necessarily stand in intimate relation to all the other parts of his system. Divines are pleased to tell us that Mr. Owen has borrowed the only good part of his system from the New Testament—that the practice of charity and kindness as described in his writings, dovetails into, and corresponds with, the precepts of Jesus Christ. And surely this part of his system cannot be termed *infidel* by a professing christian? nor can the latter prove Socialism to be an infidel system so long as any one part, or doctrine, of it corresponds with the doctrine of the christian Scriptures. But Mr. Brindley has undertaken to prove that Socialism is really an infidel system; not that some of its doctrines are contrary to christianity, but that the whole system is infidel, both the speculative doctrines and the practice of charity—those parts that agree with christianity and those that do not. This is certainly a mighty promise, but like most other promises made by Mr. Brindley, remains as yet unfulfilled.

Though we contend that Mr. Brindley has not proved in the work, and by the passage alluded to, that "Socialism is really an infidel system," we nevertheless admit that many of its doctrines are infidel to the received faith of christians; and instead of shrinking from the charge of infidelity ourselves, we boast of and glory in it. We pity the man who can apply the term to us in a popular assembly for the purpose of exciting the deeply rooted prejudices of the people against us; but at the same time we can most freely and most heartily forgive him.

The second charge which Mr. Brindley endeavours to establish against Socialism is that of *Atheism*; and in this he utterly fails. To prove the truth of his charge he quotes the following passages from the "Book of the New Moral World:—"

"The error as to free-will has led man to create a personal Deity author of all good, and a personal Devil, author of all evil: to invent all the forms of worship &c., and yet there is not

one single fact known to man, to prove that any such personalities exist or ever did exist ; and in consequence, all the mythology of the ancients, and all the religion of the moderns, are mere fanciful inventions of men.' 'And every attempt to force a belief on mankind on this subject, can only lead to error, confusion, and crime.'—*Book of the New Moral World*, p. 31. "And again at page 45, it is declared that 'truth is nature, and nature is God,' in accordance with the Mahommedan creed."—*Brindley's Reply*, p.p. 1, 2.

These passages are taken from the "Book of the New Moral World," and, as is usually the case with extracts made by Mr. Brindley, are given in a detached and garbled form. We quote the whole passage:—

"The error respecting this law of human nature has led man to create a personal Deity, author of all good ; and a personal Devil, author of all evil ; to invent all the various forms of worship of the former, and in many instances of the latter also ; and the modes of propitiating the favour of the one, and avoiding the supposed evil doings of the other. And yet, when the mind can be relieved from the early prejudices which have been forced into it on these subjects, it will be discovered that there is not one single fact known to man, after all the experience of the past generations, to prove that any such personalities exist or ever did exist ; and in consequence all the mythology of the ancients, and all the religions of the moderns are mere fanciful notions of men, whose imaginations have been cultivated to accord with existing prejudices, and whose judgments have been systematically destroyed from their birth. There is no practical advantage to be derived from the supposition that the *power of the universe is an organized being*, or that it should be personified in any manner whatever ; but on the contrary, all attempts which have been made to describe the cause of motion, of life, and of mind, have been injurious to the true interests of the human race, and every attempt to force a belief upon mankind on this subject can lead only to error, confusion, and crime."

From this passage we are warranted to infer that Mr. Owen considers an "organized being" and a "personal being" to be synonymous phrases. This affords a key to the meaning of the whole passage. Understanding the phrase "organized being" to be the synonym of "personal being," his mind revolts at the idea of attributing personality, and with it an organic structure, to what he denominates, for want of a better phrase, the "supreme power of the universe." Here, be it observed, the existence of something that produces the "endless variety of life, of mind, and of organization" is admitted by Mr. Owen as well as by his opponent: the only difference between them being that Mr. Brindley attributes to it qualities which Mr. Owen does not, and calls it a "personal conscious intelligent Deity," while Mr. Owen denominates it the "supreme power of the universe." It must be evident to every impartial reader of Mr. Owen's writings, that he admits the existence of a cause of all effects ; and this being the case it devolves upon the person who attempts to substantiate the charge of atheism against Mr. Owen, to prove the accuracy of any given definition of Deity between which and Mr. Owen's statement there is an assumed discordance. If this be not done the charge of atheism, for any thing shewn to the contrary, may be groundless.\* For example ;

\* We commend the following extract to the attention of all scholars who denounce the Socialists as a band of Atheists, and we particularly commend the translation to the notice of the author of the "Reply :"—"Nam, quæ est superstitio ? quæ ἀθεΐσμός ? quæ harum species ? qui gradus ? His demum explicitis et inter se comparitis intelligi poterit, quæ ἀθεΐσμός species qui superstitionis species, qui gradus hujus cui gradui illius, antefertur aut postponi debeat. Ac primum, in ipsis illis, de quibus agitur, rebus definiendis magna est difficultas. Quamquam Atheum quidem definire non difficile videtur ; quippe quo ipso nomine significetur is *qui nullum esse deum putet* Atqui hæc etiam definitio non intelligatur, nisi antea declaretur quid sit id quod *Dei* vocabulo significemus, omnino quæ sit definitio *Dei*. Jam nemo ignorat quantopere in notione ac definitione *Dei* dissentiant non modo universi populi, sed et singuli homines : nec solum vulgus, sed et sapientes, ita quidem ut quo plures partes sint, ex quibus hæc notio constituitur, eo minus in ea consentiant. Sed fac esse qui eam paucissimis. Complectatur proprietatibus, ut dicat *Deum esse mentem æternam, omnium rerum creatricem et gubernatricem*. Erunt, qui eum parum, erunt, qui nimium dixisse putent : neutri se atheos volent, utrique et hunc et se invicem atheos dicent. Nimirum, inquit alteri, *Dei* notio non est contenta tam paucis proprietatibus : talis *Deus* verus esse nequit. Alteri reponent contrariam reprehensionem : *Vos vero tam multa includitis attributa in Dei notionem, ut*

Mr. Owen admits the existence of a cause of every thing that begins to be, or to exist; and this cause he denominates the "supreme power of the universe." Now Mr. Brindley admits the existence of a cause of all effects as well as Mr. Owen; but he differs from Mr. Owen in his definition of that cause. Mr. Owen does not attribute to the cause, the existence of which he admits, those qualities which are to be found in connection with humanity; but Mr. Brindley says that the cause, the existence of which he as fully admits as his opponent, is "a personal, conscious, intelligent Deity." It must be obvious, therefore, to every impartial reader that the difference between Mr. Brindley and Mr. Owen lies not in the assumption or denial of the existence of a cause of all effects, but in the definitions which these reasoners give, respectively, of the cause, the existence of which is admitted by the one as potentially as by the other. And as Mr. Brindley denounces Mr. Owen as an atheist, and his system as an atheistical system, he is bound by every principle of sound reasoning to prove the accuracy of that particular definition of Deity, a dissent from which appears to him to sufficiently sub-

hæc nullo modo constare possit: talis Deus nec verus est nec omnino esse potest. Ita se res habet. Quotidie jactatur tralatitium illud verus *Deus*: quo suam quisque de Deo notionem significat, sæpe illam ineptam et summi numinis majestate indignam. Et bene nobiscum ageretur, si non ni si ab indocto vulgo jactaretur. Nunc philosophi, certe qui se philosophos haberi volunt, item crepant. Disputant de vero *Deo*, nec ab ejus definitione proficiunt, quasi vero hæc nemini ignota sit: tum ita concludunt, ut plerosque Græcorum Romanorumque sapientes verum Deum ignorasse, propterea in Atheis censendos, pronuncient. Cæterum pervulgata illa veri Dei appellatio nobis venit a consuetudine Ecclesiæ, cujus diversæ quondam sectæ notionem Dei diverso modo informant, ejus ignorationem et ἀθεΐα non modo profanis, sed invicem aliæ aliis sectis exprobrare solebant. Hæc de notione *Athei*: quæ profecto, nisi constituta notione Dei, constitui ipsa nequit.—*Daniel Wyttienbach's first note to Plutarchus on Superstition, Mor. Tom. 6, p. 484. Oæon 1810.*

"For what is superstition, and what is Atheism? And what are the species and degrees of these (vices)? When these (words) are explained, and compared with one another, we may then understand what sort or degree of Atheism, ought to be preferred or rejected (as compared with) such or such a sort or degree of superstition. But, first of all, it is very difficult to define these words which are the subject of disputation. The word Atheist may indeed be easily defined; as its derivation shews it to mean "one who supposes that there is no God." But this definition cannot be understood till we declare what we mean by the word "*God*."

Now it is well known, how much, not only whole nations, but even separate individuals—and not only the vulgar, but even the learned,—differ in their notions and definitions of God; so that, the more they (write) upon the subject, the less they agree about it. Suppose, however, than we reduce this definition to the fewest possible terms, and say that God is an eternal mind, the creator and ruler of all things. Some persons will think that this (definition) implies too much; others that it implies too little: neither party will consent to be called *Atheists*, and yet each party accuse the other of being *Atheists*. 'Certainly,' says one party, 'the idea of God cannot be comprized in so scanty a definition: such a God cannot be the true God.' The other party answers: 'you include so many attributes in your idea of the Deity, that it cannot possibly be admitted: such a God is not the true God, and indeed cannot possibly exist.' Such then is the present state of the subject. We are every day hearing that hackneyed phrase 'the true God,' by which (phrase) every man implies his own notion of the Deity often a silly (notion) unworthy of the supreme power.

And it would be lucky for us if such (notions and such a method of argumentation) were confined to the unlearned vulgar. But now, philosophers,—at any rate, persons who wish to be considered as philosophers,—talk in the same random style. They dispute about 'the true God,' yet do not set out with a definition, considering that to be known by all persons. Afterwards they pronounce that many of the Grecian and Roman sages were unacquainted with 'the true God,' and must therefore be considered as *Atheists*. I may here observe that this very commonly used appellation 'the true God,' has come to us from the custom of the church, whose different sects formed, in ancient times, different notions of the Deity, and were therefore in the habit of reproaching, not only the profane, but even one another, with an ignorance of (the true God,) and (consequently) with Atheism.

"Thus much concerning the word *Atheist*, of which we can form no idea until we have determined our notion of the Deity."

stantiate the charge of atheism. This Mr. Brindley endeavours to do in another part of his work, but with what success shall more fully appear as we proceed with his arguments in detail.

Mr. Brindley having proved to his own satisfaction, though certainly not to that of his readers, that Socialism is really an "Infidel and Atheistical system," enters on the more argumentative part of his work by saying, "we shall therefore at once proceed to shew how completely indefensible such principles are, by proving, First, *That there is in man an immaterial and immortal soul.*"\* &c. &c.

That we may not render ourselves liable to the charge of anything like unfairness we shall present the reader with the whole of his argument, as stated by himself in the second, third, fourth and fifth pages of his "Reply."

\* First, there is in man an immaterial and immortal soul.

"It is a well known fact in physiology, that from the moment our body comes into the world the materials of which it is composed are constantly changing. The food taken into the stomach, acted upon by the digestive organs, and assimilated to our nature, is then sent to the blood to supply it with new food for the system, which is continually parting with the worn-out elements that have become unfit for the purposes of life. To carry on this two-fold action, two distinct sets of vessels are employed, which from their respective offices have been named absorbents and secretants; the former drinking up, as it were, the waste matter, and ejecting it from the system; the latter separating from the blood the particular parts adapted to repair the particular organs for which they are required, and depositing them in their proper places. Thus it follows, that within the space of nine or ten years the *entire material of the body is changed*: so that no persons who read this have the same bodies now they had ten years ago. They have new bones, new flesh, new blood, new brains. This being an admitted and demonstrable fact, it is quite clear that if there existed in the human being no fixed immaterial principle, independent of the bodily organism, and the decay it is subject to, man could not possibly recall events and circumstances that have been long absent. But then it is a fact that man can do this. Experience informs us that we can recollect those things that were present to our minds not only eight or ten years ago, but those also of twice or thrice that date. As a case in point: A man leaves his native country, and after remaining amongst strangers in a foreign land, throughout the greater portion of his life, at length returns to the place of his birth and the home of his childhood, where he seeks for in vain his early contemporaries, and finds those he once loved long since numbered with the dead. Yet as he looks round upon the scene of his early joys, and treads the ground of his infancy's pastime—as he contemplates the monumental stone of her who watched him in his cradle, tended him in his helplessness, and followed him with a mother's tears when last they bade farewell, a thousand recollections rush upon his mind, again he sees the look, and hears the voice that once was hers; and thus by memory's faithfulness is raised the fond remembrance of the past.

"What is it" [that] "thus recalls ideas? It cannot be the body that originally entertained them; that has long since ceased to be—has been carried off by the absorbents—reduced to its primitive elements—mixed with the common mass that once had life—been recombined and moulded into being. These thoughts and these remembrances are of thirty years ago; not one particle of the material of the body that then was, remained united with it for a third of that time. It cannot be the body that now is, that re-collects what it never before entertained; these feet never trod the ground of our childhood's mirth; these arms never met the embraces of those we loved; neither have these eyes and these ears seen or heard them. Yet, so perfectly are they pictured to the mind, that we could even persuade ourselves those objects were still before us. What is it then that does re-call ideas. Pause for a moment to reflect upon this." "It were downright folly to say that the eye sees that which is now nowhere in existence—much more to say the body re-collects or collects again, impressions it never had before. The objects themselves may have been dead and buried these twenty years—the material of the present body is not of half that age.

"Let us then arrange these premises, and see to what conclusion they fairly lead us.

"First.—It is a demonstrable fact—that the whole material of the human body is renewed at least once in every ten years.

"Second.—It is a demonstrable fact—that after thrice ten years we can recover the form and appearance of objects that have long since passed away.

"Third.—It is a demonstrable fact—that we can also call to mind a great variety of circumstances in connection with those objects, and a great variety of ideas and opinions we formerly

\* Brindley's Reply, p. 2.

entertained thereon, although such circumstances, ideas and opinions, have been entirely absent for twenty or thirty years at least.

"Then it must follow as a plain conclusion, that since the mind or soul, the personality remains the same throughout all the changes the body undergoes, it cannot possibly constitute any portion of the material of the body; and being distinct from and independent of it, must of necessity be immaterial.

"But the body is mortal as well as material. One body is carried off by the *absorbents*, another supplied by the *secrements*. I had one body as an infant; I had another at the age of eight or ten years, another at the age of eighteen or twenty, and again another at thirty; and this will have died away and be replaced by a fifth should I live to the age of forty. Yet the same mind, or soul, the same personality, has outlived them all: *then must the soul be immortal as well as immaterial*, as is proved even by reference to this life alone. It now outlives body after body that dies away by degrees; *it will bye-and-by outlive a body that by the stroke of death shall die away all at once*. In this life the material body is necessary, that through it the immaterial principle may be manifested to a material world; but in the land of spirits—in the eternal world of glory, we shall then know even as also we are known, 'for this corruptible shall put on an incorruption, this mortal shall put on immortality.'"

This argument has been advanced by immaterialists, both lay and clerical, hundreds of times before, and therefore cannot with any degree of truth be said to be the exclusive mental property of John Brindley. It was employed by reasoners to prove the soul's immateriality and immortality long before the Author of the "Reply" could re-collect ideas, or think, or feel, or reason. It is ably stated in the "dissertation on personal identity" appended to Bishop Butler's "Analogy of Religion." There is however some difference between the argument as stated by the gigantic intellect of Butler, and the argument as stated by—(may heaven forgive us for making the comparison)—the pseudo-philosopher of MARCH. The former rests his proof of the soul's immateriality on the fact that men are conscious of *sameness*, of *personality*, of *identity of being*, amid the varied changes which the body is liable to, and which it in reality undergoes; but the latter rests his proof of the same doctrine on the fact that man can re-collect ideas—can mentally recall the form and appearance of objects seen twenty or thirty or it may be seventy years ago, though the material of his physical structure has been changed many times during that period. The former method of stating the argument is certainly preferable to the latter, because it stands in closer relation to the doctrine it is brought forward to support. The power of recollecting ideas, and of mentally recalling the image of the past, may, for any thing that can be shown to the contrary, be a property of the organic structure—not merely of the material, but of the material organized—and so long as the organic structure remains perfect, so long the power of recollecting ideas may remain perfect too. But if the consciousness of the identity of that which *thinks*, and *feels now*, with that which *thought* and *felt twenty years ago*, be assumed as the strongest proof of the existence of a human immaterial personality, or being, then the argument assumes a more commanding and plausible appearance, than it does in the form in which it is stated by John Brindley. We shall examine the argument as it is stated by both these writers.

Bishop Butler observes:—

"All presumption of death's being the destruction of living beings, must go upon the supposition that they are compounded and so discernible; but, *since consciousness is a single and indivisible power*, it should seem that the subject in which it resides should be so too. For were the motion of any particle of matter absolutely one and indivisible, so as that it should imply a contradiction to suppose part of this motion to exist and part not to exist, that is, part of this matter to move and part to be at rest, then its power of motion would be indivisible, and so also would the subject in which the power inheres, namely the particle of matter; for if this could be divided into two, one part might be moved and the other at rest, which is contrary to the supposition. In like manner it has been argued, and for anything appearing to the contrary, justly, that since the perception,

or consciousness, which we have of our own existence, is indivisible, so as that it is a contradiction to suppose one part of it should be *here* and the other *there*; the perceptive power, or the power of consciousness, is indivisible too, and consequently, the subject in which it resides, that is, the conscious being. Now, upon supposition that the living agent each man calls himself, is thus a single being, which there is at least no more difficulty in conceiving, than in conceiving it to be a compound, and of which there is the proof now mentioned, it follows that our organized bodies are no more ourselves, or part of ourselves, than any other matter around us. And it is as easy to conceive how matter, which is no part of ourselves, may be appropriated to us in the manner in which our present bodies are, as how we can receive impressions from, and have power over, any matter. It is as easy to conceive that we may exist out of bodies, as in them; that we might have animated bodies of any other organs and senses wholly different from these now given us, and that we may hereafter animate these same or new bodies variously modified and organized, as to conceive how we can animate such bodies as our present. And, lastly, the dissolution of all these several organized bodies, supposing ourselves to have successively animated them, would have no more conceivable tendency to destroy the living beings, ourselves, or deprive us of living faculties, the faculties of perception and of action, than the dissolution of any foreign matter which we are capable of receiving impressions from, and making use of, for the common occasions of life."—*Bp. Butler's Analogy of Religion*, Part 1, chap. 1. p. 11. People's Edit.

The whole force of the foregoing argument rests upon the assumption, that "*consciousness* is simple" or indiscerptible, from which is deduced the consequence that the being that is conscious, must be indiscerptible or indivisible also. This is the very root and basis of the Bishop's argument, and if it be untenable, the remainder of his reasoning must be equally as untenable as the assumption on which it is founded. This argument may be met in various ways: as

First.—If it can be proved that consciousness is not indivisible, then it follows, according to the Bishop's style of reasoning, that that in which consciousness inheres is not indivisible, and if not indivisible it must be composed of parts, and if composed of parts capable of being destroyed. Or

Second.—Admitting for the sake of argument, the unity, simplicity, or indivisibility of consciousness, if it can be shown that no man can by any process of reasoning whatever, prove the fact thus admitted, then it follows that no man can prove the indiscerptibility, and, by consequence, the immateriality of the being that is conscious. Or

Third.—If it can be proved that the assumption of indivisibility, as it regards consciousness, involves not the inference that the being that is conscious is indivisible, then it follows that the Bishop's argument with all its "buts," "ifs," "suppositions," "may be's," and misty cloud of analogies is rendered altogether useless.

First.—In discussing the proposition which asserts the indivisibility of consciousness, it would seem necessary for the Bishop to have defined the meaning of the term at the outset. This he has not done. What is consciousness? A satisfactory answer to this question seems of the first importance to the Bishop's argument: for if we cannot define consciousness—if we have no means of ascertaining what the nature of consciousness is, how can we truthfully say it is *indivisible*? But it will be said, "we are conscious that our consciousness is indivisible." This is merely begging the question. It is making the assumption the proof of itself, or, if you will have it so, the fact the proof of the fact. This is certainly a logical and most conclusive way of evading a difficulty and deciding a controversy! But it will be said, "it is a contradiction to suppose one part of consciousness here, and another part of it there." This is again begging the question; for if it be not assumed, first, that consciousness is indivisible, it cannot surely be assumed that it is a contradiction to suppose one part of it here and another part there. It may,

however, be said, "our experience convinces us that our consciousness is indivisible." We ask whose experience? That of all men? We deny it. We are men ourselves and we have no such experience. We cannot tell whether that which thinks and is conscious, and by consequence consciousness itself, be spread over the whole brain, or over a particular part of it; and therefore, for anything our experience or consciousness shews to the contrary, the subject of consciousness may be extended; and if extended, may be divided in abstraction at least, and if so, its indivisibility and immateriality cannot, by any possibility, be demonstrated. The whimsy, then, of an indivisible consciousness must be supported by the whim of an indivisible consciousness, which is the sheer end of logic and of reasoning; or, more accurately, perhaps, "consciousness is indivisible because consciousness is indivisible," which is the very best proof that can be afforded of its indivisibility.

Butler, Clark, and other metaphysical divines, along with all the petty intellects that follow in their wake, speak of consciousness as if it was an existence, a reality, a something positive, and not merely a state of feeling, or capacity, which a thing possesses of experiencing consciousness. It is true that in their definitions they state it to have merely a relative existence; but in their reasonings they confound it with those things which have a real existence. And because it is assumed that consciousness, which exists relatively is indivisible, it is further assumed that that which is the substratum of consciousness, and which exists really, must also be indivisible. Now we ask how can it be proved that the substratum is indivisible unless it be first proved that consciousness is indivisible? And we ask again, how consciousness can be proved to be indivisible unless it be proved first that the *substance* in which it inheres is indivisible? And we ask further, how can either of these points be proved unless we assume at the very outset, the very point to be proved? And yet this is the very best argument that can be advanced in favour of the doctrine of an immaterial soul.

We are conscious of *oneness* of person; but we are not conscious of the indivisibility of the substance of that person.\* Between these two cases there is a wide and essential difference; and it is by confounding the idea of *sameness* of person, with the idea of *sameness of substance*, that theologians manage to eke out their argument for an immaterial soul. Yet it must be obvious to the accurate thinker, that there is a wide and essential difference between the consciousness of sameness of person, and the consciousness of sameness of substance. For example: we are conscious that we exist now, and we recollect having been in existence twenty years ago; but we are not conscious of the unchangeability of our bodies, or of our spirits, admitting, for the sake of argument, the existence of an immaterial soul. But it is

\* The Bishop in a subsequent paragraph, observes "the simplicity and absolute oneness of a living agent cannot, indeed, from the nature of the thing, be properly proved by experimental observations; but as these fall in with the supposition of its unity," (O the craft of a priestly sophist.) "so they lead us to conclude certainly," (No doubt,) "that our gross organized bodies, with which we perceive the objects of sense, and with which we act, are no part of ourselves, and therefore show us that we have no reason to believe their destruction to be ours even without determining whether our living substances be immaterial, or material." This is leading on the forlorn hope in the metaphysical combat, the last desperate charge of the vanquished, to retrieve, if possible, the fortune of the day. Where is the proof that experimental observations fall in with the supposition of indivisibility, simplicity, or absolute oneness, as it regards the living being? What are the nature of the observations? On what substance are those observations made? Is it just to reason from a supposition as if it were a fact? Alas, poor Joseph, you were hard pressed by reason, common sense, and matter of fact when you made the admission before noticed.

necessary that we should be conscious of *sameness of substance*, and not merely of sameness of person, in order to render the argument drawn from consciousness available to the immaterialist.

The rivers Mississippi and St. Lawrence, though their waters are in a state of perpetual fluctuation, are nevertheless to all intents and purposes the same rivers that they were twenty or a hundred years ago. And we speak of the identity of the river St. Lawrence as it exists now, with the river St. Lawrence as it existed one hundred years ago, as a determined point about which there is little difference of opinion. Yet the particles of water, which united into a volume constitute the river St. Lawrence now, are not the same particles of water which constituted it twenty or thirty years ago; for the waters of the St. Lawrence are perpetually flowing onwards towards the ocean, and are as constantly succeeded by fresh volumes of water, which, though similar in nature and qualities, are not *identical in substance* with that which flows away. The same reasoning will apply to animals, vegetables, plants, trees, and men. The substance of these may be in a state of perpetual fluctuation; and yet the personality, the organization of the material, and all the powers consequent upon the organization of the material, be preserved entire and throughout.

Suppose we assume,—(and we only assume it in this place for the sake of argument.)—that the power of perceiving, of judging, and of reasoning, along with the capacity of being conscious, are dependent upon, and result from, the particular organization of the material of our bodies, an opponent will find it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to prove the converse of our assumption. In order to accomplish such an object, he must possess an accurate and perfect knowledge, not merely of the general properties of matter, but of the very nature of it; of all the properties it possesses when presented to us in the shape of a stone, an atom, or a world; and of all the properties it might by possibility acquire in consequence of entering into an endlessly diversified series of combinations. In addition to this, he must be able to understand the nature of that impalpable, imponderable, immaterial *nonentity* he denominates *spirit*; for unless he does understand this, unless he can prove that an immaterial existence can think and reason apart from the body, and be conscious in itself, and without the aid of the organic structure, he is not warranted, by any principle of sound reasoning, to infer from the fact of human consciousness, the existence of an immaterial spirit that is conscious. Because the fact of human consciousness only proves the existence of a being that is conscious; but proves nothing respecting the nature of that being. For anything that consciousness shews to the contrary, its *substratum*, i. e. the being that is conscious, may be palpable or impalpable, matter or spirit. Unless, then, it can be proved that material substance, in both its unorganized and organized state, is entirely destitute of, and cannot by any means acquire, the capacity of being conscious, it can never be proved that it is an immaterial spirit, and an immaterial spirit alone, that is the subject of consciousness.

We ask the followers of Clark, Butler, and other metaphysical theologians, and we urge them to give a definite reply to the question, how they can prove that material substance is incapable of becoming conscious, unless they possess a perfect knowledge of all the properties which it possesses and which it may acquire by combination? We require them also to produce a man who assumes the possession of this knowledge; and

when they have done that, we require them to produce proof of the assumption the person produced makes. These are important points to be decided—points which are connected with the very core of the controversy; and until they are decided, fairly and satisfactorily, thinking minds will not be disposed to receive the dogmatical assertions of Joseph Butler, or Samuel Clarke, as proofs of the doctrine they laboured to support.

Bishop Butler, in order to make good his argument, ought to have proved:

First.—That consciousness is indiscerptible; and

Second.—That an indiscerptible quality, affection, or state of being, can only belong to an indiscerptible substance.

Or, he ought to have proved *a priori* :—

First.—That the substratum of consciousness is indiscerptible; and, if exceedingly anxious to prove the indiscerptibility of consciousness, he ought to have proved

Second.—That an indiscerptible substance can only be the substratum of an indiscerptible quality.

He has done neither the one nor the other of these things; but instead thereof has assumed at the very outset of his reasoning the very point to be proved. He says, "All presumption of death being the destruction of living beings, must go upon the supposition that they are compounded, and so discernible; *but*, since consciousness is a single and indivisible power, it should seem that the subject in which it resides must be so too."

This passage contains three assumptions :—

First.—That all presumption of death being the destruction of a living being must be founded on the supposition of its indivisibility.

Second.—That consciousness is an indivisible power; and

Third.—That the subject of consciousness is indivisible also.

We ask, where is the proof of these assumptions? and probably our attention will be directed to the Bishop's reasoning. To the Bishop's reasoning, then, we shall go, and out of his own mouth condemn him :—

*"For were the motion of any particle of matter absolutely one and indivisible, so as that it should imply a contradiction to suppose part of this motion to exist and part not to exist, that is part of this matter to move and part to be at rest, then its power of motion would be indivisible, and so also would the subject in which the power inheres, namely the particle of matter; for if this could be divided into two, one part might be moved and the other at rest, which is contrary to the supposition."*

All this is doubtless very fair, but withal very unphilosophical, for it is not only making a supposition to illustrate or prove something that is to follow, but it is making a supposition, and then from the very nature of that supposition arguing that the supposition has been made. In strict propriety of reasoning, this is perfectly monstrous. When Butler had assumed the indivisibility of motion as it respects a particle of matter, it certainly was not necessary for him to advance an argument to prove that we could not assume the indivisibility and divisibility of motion at the same time, without involving ourselves in a contradiction. The sum and substance of the Bishop's reasoning amounts to this: that the assumption of indivisibility, is the assumption of indivisibility; no doubt a very wise conclusion, and an admirable evidence of the mightiness of the Bishop's intellect.

After endeavouring to prove that the assumption of an indivisible motion, is the assumption of an indivisible motion; and that the assumption of an indivisible motion involves the assumption of an indivisible substance, the Bishop proceeds :—

"In like manner it has been argued, and for any thing appearing to the contrary, justly, *that since the perception of consciousness is INDIVISIBLE*, so as that it is a contradiction to suppose one part of it should be here, and the other there, the perceptive power, or the power of consciousness, is indivisible too, and consequently the subject in which it resides, that is the conscious being."

Here be it observed, that consciousness, the power of consciousness, and the subject of consciousness, are all raised to the dignity of indivisible abstractions; and though all bound together, as it were, are represented as distinct from each other. Now if consciousness be indivisible, and if all supposition of the destruction of a living being is founded on the assumption of its divisibility, then it follows, that consciousness cannot be destroyed; and if so, the power of consciousness must exist along with it, as well as the being that is the subject of that power. But if it should be said that consciousness is not a living being, but the attribute of a living being, we will waive that point, and say that an immaterial spirit, on account of being indiscernible, cannot be destroyed. Now consciousness is assumed to be an indiscernible attribute, and an indiscernible attribute can no more be destroyed than an indiscernible substance; and especially when it is the attribute of an indiscernible substance. Let the reader bear in mind that *indivisibility in the substance* is the basis on which Butler erects his argument for the necessary immortality of the soul; and indivisibility of consciousness is assumed in order to prove the indivisibility of the substance that is conscious. Keeping this in our "mind's eye," let us put the question to Nature, and hear what the beautiful enchantress has to say upon the subject.

First.—We ask what becomes of the consciousness during the hours of sleep?

Second.—What becomes of it when a man receives an injury on the head?

The strongest argument that can be advanced in proof of the fact that consciousness is lost during a sound sleep must be drawn from universal experience. We are all conscious that we are not conscious even of our own existence during the season of solemn and sound repose. It is true we know in our waking moments that we have existed in a state of sleep; but this is a conclusion arrived at by reasoning—an induction from experience, and not the result of our consciousness while in a state of sleep. We have seen individuals asleep, and when we awake out of sleep ourselves we are conscious of existence, in addition to which we recollect having existed before we fell asleep; and this convinces us that we existed while in a state of sleep. But there is a wide difference between a conviction produced by a process of reasoning and a conviction produced by a consciousness perpetuated throughout our whole life, whether we are asleep or awake. In the one case the reasoning precedes the conviction, in the other case the consciousness is the conviction itself. Is it not, then, a fact that we are entirely destitute of consciousness when in a sound sleep? We appeal to universal experience for a reply. And what is the answer? Why, that we neither know that we exist ourselves nor that anything else exists when we are asleep. And is not this a proof—a proof drawn from human experience and with which every man is conversant—a proof of the strongest nature that the subject will admit of, that consciousness is destroyed during a considerable portion of our existence? And if this be the case, it follows that the Bishop's first assumption, viz., that "an indivisible thing cannot be destroyed," is a fallacy; or that his second assumption, viz., that "consciousness is indivisible," is a fallacy advanced either through a mistaken view of the subject, or with the intention of supporting a whimsical hypothesis at all haps and hazards.

But it will be said that consciousness is not destroyed during the season of sleep, but merely suspended. This is a poor and pitiful attempt to evade the force of a powerful and conclusive argument. The propounders of such a quibble forget that a distinction is made by immaterialists between "consciousness," and the "power of consciousness;" and that it must be the latter, and not the former, which is suspended. If they assert the contrary, we call on them to prove the identity of the particular feeling of consciousness we have when we lie down to sleep, with the particular feeling of consciousness we have when we awake. And how can they do this? By an appeal to experience? Experience will not enable them to do so. Experience convinces us that we are bereft of our consciousness during sleep; and it is a palpable contradiction to suppose that our consciousness exists when we are unconscious of it.

But not only can we be deprived of consciousness during sleep, but the power of consciousness can be suspended, deranged, and virtually extinguished by a severe blow upon the head, or by an injury done to the brain in some other way. This fact is so notoriously palpable, that it is admitted by immaterialists themselves; and in order to evade the force of the inferences directly emergent from it, they argue as follows:—

If a musical instrument be out of repair, a musician cannot produce those harmonious combinations of sound which he could produce by its aid, were it in a proper state. In this case the defect is in the instrument, and not in the musician. The latter may be expert in the mechanical part of music, and well acquainted with the theory of it; but in consequence of the defect in the instrument, he is unable to produce those varied combinations of tones which excite the soul to rapture and ecstasy. Now the *brain* is the organ of the mind—the organ by which it manifests itself to a material world—and if this organ be disordered, it will follow that the mind cannot manifest itself no more than the musician could play on a defective instrument. But it does not follow from this, that the mind must be disordered; for the mind may still retain its power of operating, though the instrument by which it manifests itself to a material world has become unfit for the purposes of such manifestation.

It may be replied to this argument, that

First.—There is but a faint analogy between the cases specified; and

Second.—The argument disproves the doctrine it is brought forward to establish.

It would be easy to shew that there is but a faint analogy between the case of a musician producing musical sounds, and the case of an immaterial spirit producing consciousness, or becoming conscious of its own existence, by the aid of the brain. And it would be easy to shew also, that it is unphilosophical to deduce a positive dogma from a weak and faint analogy. But this mode of reply we waive for the present, inasmuch as the latter mode we have mentioned is the most conclusive. Now the power of being conscious of personality, or even conscious of *sameness of substance*, must be an attribute of an immaterial existence, or it must be an attribute of the brain, or it must be an attribute resulting from the junction of the immaterial existence with the brain. If the power of consciousness be an attribute of the brain, then the brain which is material, must be immortal, if there be any truth in the Bishop's reasoning. For if consciousness be indivisible, then the substance in which it inheres must be indivisible also: and if it be indivisible, it must necessarily be immortal. Experience, however, convinces us of the contrary. But if the power of consciousness be an attribute of the brain and spirit combined, then it will follow

that its indivisibility cannot be proved. For if it be argued that consciousness is indivisible because it is connected with an indivisible spirit,—one part of the compound,—it may be argued *a fortiori*, that consciousness must be divisible because it is connected with material substance, the other part of the compound : because, according to the supposition, consciousness and the power of being conscious, are the joint products of a material and immaterial substance in union. It will follow then from these premises, that consciousness is indivisible, though inhering in a substance partly divisible, and partly indivisible ; or that consciousness is divisible, though inhering in the same mixed substratum. Since, then, it is a demonstrable fact, admitted on all hands, that the brain is divisible ; and since on the foregoing supposition the argument drawn from the unity of consciousness, in favour of the existence of an indivisible spirit, is equally potent when advanced to support the hypothesis of an indivisible brain, it follows that the indivisibility of either the mind or the brain cannot, *ex hypothesi*, be demonstrated ; and by consequence, the immateriality of the mind cannot be demonstrated.

We now come to the third hypothesis, viz, that the power of consciousness is an attribute of the spirit, and of the spirit alone, and not the mere product of its junction with the body. And here it is that the awkward physiological facts we have before alluded to, step in, as it were, and marshal themselves in fearful array against the wild and incoherent speculations of Butler and his followers. If consciousness, or the power of being conscious, be an attribute of the spirit, and of the spirit alone, how is it that a blow upon the head can deprive the spirit of an attribute which is essential to its nature, which is indivisible and impalpable like itself ? How can a material body, which possesses length, breadth, and thickness, operate on that which having neither length, breadth, nor thickness, can present no point of contact to the operating substance ? We ask these questions, and we ask them with an air of triumph, for we know they cannot be satisfactorily answered. To adopt, for a moment, the *cavalier* tone of John Brindley, we “dare, we challenge, we defy” immaterialists to give a satisfactory answer to these questions.

In the argument to which we are now replying, it is assumed that the brain is the organ by which the spirit manifests itself to the material world. This pitiful and sophistical assumption we shall unmask, when we come to examine the line of argument adopted by Mr. Brindley.

We might say much more on the sophistry, the gross and palpable sophistry, contained in Butler’s “Analogy of Religion.” But we must abandon the Bishop’s book, that we may examine the arguments contained in a book written by a Bishop’s satellite.

Mr. Brindley’s argument for the immateriality of that which thinks, is founded on the fact that man has the power of recollecting ideas, of recalling the form and appearance of objects seen twenty, or it may be thirty years ago ; while at the same time it is a demonstrable fact, that the material of our bodies changes several times during that period. Mr. Brindley contends that on the supposition of the body being the recipient of an impression *made*, or the subject of an idea *produced*, thirty years ago, that *that* body has passed away, and a body consisting of new *material* has taken its place ; while at the same time our *present selves* possess a power of calling up ideas which were present to the mind thirty years ago. We are anxious to state Mr. Brindley’s vaunted argument fairly, in order that we may meet it in an honourable and conclusive manner. If any of our readers think we have not done this, we advise them

to look to the quotation from Mr. Brindley's book, given at a preceding page, and they will find it there, *mutatis mutandis* as it is given here.

Now this argument is a paltry and pitiable sophism, by no means warranting the inferences drawn from it by Mr. Brindley. The premises of an argument may be correct, but the conclusions deduced from them by a particular reasoner, may be wrong: precisely the case with Mr. Brindley's argument. This, which is mere assumption at present, remains to be proved.

First.—It is assumed that the material of the human organization changes once in seven, eight, or ten years. This assumption we admit.

Second.—It is assumed that man has the power of recalling the form and appearance of objects seen twenty or thirty years ago. This assumption we also admit.

Third.—From these premises it is inferred that the substance which thinks and remembers now, is the identical substance that thought, felt, and observed thirty years ago. Here lies the lurking sophistry of the whole argument, so far as the recollection of ideas is concerned. This inference we deny.

If Mr. Brindley's argument be of any service whatever to the cause of immaterialists, it must be in consequence of the strong proof it affords respecting the sameness of substance in that which thinks. But it proves nothing of this sort. The only thing it proves, is—not that we can *re-collect* ideas, as Mr. Brindley absurdly states, but—that ideas similar to those we entertained perhaps thirty years ago are produced in the mind. But there is a wide difference between similarity and identity of ideas. There is as great a difference between similarity and identity, as it regards ideas, as there is as it respects the subjects of ideas. If it be possible for two men to entertain precisely similar ideas relative to some particular truth, doctrine, or fact, it must be obvious to even the most superficial thinker, that these ideas, though similar, are not identical. They are two ideas, and not one; and therefore identity can never be justly predicated of them. In the same way a feeling, a thought, a particular consciousness, or an idea, which we may be the subjects of now, though it may be similar to, that is resemble, a feeling, a thought, a particular consciousness, or an idea which we were the subjects of thirty years ago, is manifestly not the *same*, i. e. not identical. An *idea* is a thing that exists in relation to the mind, or that which thinks. It has therefore a relative and not a real existence. It does not exist of itself, but by its connection with something which has a positive existence. When, therefore, that connection is destroyed, the idea is destroyed; and if this be denied, and the converse assumed, we require the assumer to prove how an idea can exist apart from its subject? how it can exist and the thinking being be unconscious of its existence? and how it can exist so as that the thinking being should be able, whenever he thinks proper, to take it up and examine it mentally, as a connoisseur in painting would physically and mentally examine a picture? And how can this be proved? From what source is the process of argumentation to be drawn which shall satisfactorily establish the assumed fact, that an idea, feeling, or particular consciousness of which we are the subjects now, is the *same* idea, feeling, or particular consciousness we had thirty years ago? Is the proof to be drawn from consciousness? No! We are not conscious of any thing but similarity,—not *sameness*,—of ideas. Is it to be drawn from reason? Reason plainly declares that a thing which exists relatively, cannot exist when the connection between it and its substratum is destroyed. Here then it must be obvious that it is impossible to prove the identity of an idea, or a particular consciousness which exists *now*, with an

idea or particular consciousness which existed thirty, forty, or seventy years ago; and therefore the only basis on which the argument for an immaterial spirit can be built, is the fact that ideas *similar* to those we once entertained are raised up by, or produced in, the being that *thinks*. This argument we shall proceed to examine.

It is assumed by Mr. Brindley and his hopeful adviser, the editor of the "Morning Star," and "London Phalanx," that if the power of thinking be a property of an organized material structure, it must pass away as the body changes; but as the power of thinking does not pass away with the particles which are thrown off by the body, it is inferred that the power of thinking belongs to something, or is the property of something, which in substance is unchangeable, immaterial and immortal. But we ask where is the proof of the assumption made by these very religious gentlemen? Where is the proof that on the supposition of the power of thinking and being conscious being a property of an organized material substance, it must pass away and be changed in its nature, in proportion as the particles of matter are thrown off from the body? We might as well argue that walking, and the power of walking, must cease, because the particles of matter which constituted our limbs thirty years ago have been replaced by new particles. Or that digestion, and the power of digestion, must have ceased, because the material of our stomachs has changed several times during the last thirty years. Reasoners of the class we have mentioned, leave out of their calculations the fact that in proportion as the particles of matter are thrown off from the body, they lose the particular properties which they had acquired by their combination with the particles which remain in the compound, while the fresh portions of matter which are added acquire the same properties which those thrown off lose by being separated from the compound. Thus the food that we take into the mouth, though dead when received into the stomach, becomes in a short space of time converted into chyle, and, entering into the blood, forms part of our living selves. From the blood the more solid parts of the system are supplied with nutriment. The bones, muscles, and fat are all nourished by the blood; and the whole system is kept in repair by the food we receive into the stomach. Here then is a fact,—a fact with which every person is conversant, a fact which cannot be denied, and which is equally mysterious with the production of intelligence. How is it possible for dead matter to become alive—to acquire a new property if, as Mr. Brindley asserts, "matter by combination cannot acquire properties which the particles do not possess separately?" It is true we shall be told by Mr. Brindley, Mr. Doherty, and Bishop Butler, that it is the immaterial soul that thus appropriates and assimilates the matter which enters our bodies to itself. But where is the proof of this assumption? Is it necessary in order to get over the inferences emergent from an awkward fact, to assume the existence of an immaterial being, and then on the strength of that assumption, build up another, namely, that it is the soul that thus appropriates matter to itself? But supposing we allow the assumptions of these gentlemen to pass, still the fact we have alluded to is not explained, nor the inferences emergent from it obviated. If there be in man a personal, conscious, immaterial spirit, it surely is not that spirit which communicates life to the particles of matter which become added to our frames? Does the soul digest, masticate, and separate the nutrient particles of food from those which are not nutritious? And even if this be admitted, it may be asked how do the particles of matter which enter the bodies of inferior animals become alive? Have all living things immaterial souls too, which appropriate

the matter which from time to time enters their bodies to themselves? Has the oyster an immaterial soul? And when it yawns to the ocean, is it the immaterial personality which bids or commands it to yawn, so as that the immaterial personality may collect certain portions of matter from the advancing waves, and appropriate them to its own use? Do horses, elephants, and asses decide as to whether they will eat food or not when it is presented to them? If it be said that they do not decide, we ask where is the proof of this assertion? And if it be said that they do, we ask can decision or volition belong to matter? If the phenomenon of volition belongs to, or can take place in, a piece of organized matter in the shape of a horse, an ass, or an elephant, is it not as strong a proof of the existence of something immaterial in the horse, the ass, or the elephant, as it is in the case of a man deciding? Those who deny the similarity between the volition of a horse and the volition of a man, ought to advance the reasons on which their denial is founded. If they assume that there is no similarity between the cases specified, then we ask them whence their information is drawn? From consciousness? That is impossible; because in order that John Brindley might be able to draw an argument from consciousness, in favour of the supposition, that volition does not take place in a beetle or an ass, he must become a beetle or an ass himself, and have the consciousness of a beetle or an ass, and then he may be able to speak practically on the subject—but not till then. It follows then, that animals exhibit certain characteristics, such as memory, perception, and volition, which are essentially of a mental kind, and which belong to a material compound: in which case all the other mental characteristics of men may also belong to a material compound, or, that these qualities belong essentially to an impalpable substance called *spirit*, which exists in all animals, and which in the elephant and the oyster is alike immortal.

It should be kept in remembrance that the basis on which Mr. Brindley erects his argument for the immortality of the soul, is the fact that ideas similar to ideas that existed thirty years ago, are raised up in the mind or in the thinking being. In discussing this argument it is necessary that we should take into account

First.—The power by which the ideas are raised.

Second.—The process by which the ideas are raised. And

Third.—The manner in which the remembrance of an event may be perpetuated, even though the material of the body undergoes many revolutions.

The power by which ideas are raised in the mind must belong to man essentially, independent of all external and exciting causes; or it must belong to man as an organized being, operated on by the circumstances in which he is placed. Assuming for the sake of argument, the existence of an immaterial spirit in man, it follows that the power of raising ideas must be an attribute of the immaterial existence independent of its connection with the body, or it must be an attribute of the body, or it must be a power resulting from the union of the immaterial principle with the organic structure. On the supposition that the power of raising ideas is an attribute of the mind, and of the mind alone, independent of its connection with the organized structure, it follows that the mind could raise ideas without the aid of the senses, or the brain, or external objects. But who can prove that such a phenomenon ever takes place? In order that we may have an idea of an object, it is necessary that the object should be perceived; and in order that the object should be perceived, it is surely necessary that it should exist; and in order that we may perceive an object, it is necessary that we

should have senses through the medium of which a perception of the object may be excited in us. Who ever heard of a blind man perceiving colours, a deaf man perceiving sounds, or a man destitute of the organ of smell perceiving odours by his soul, his immaterial principle, alone? The supposition carries its own refutation on the face of it. If, then, the perception of objects be a necessary part of the process by which ideas are raised, and if the perception of objects be connected with senses and a brain, it follows that the power of raising up ideas similar to those we were the subject of thirty years ago cannot be exclusively and wholly an attribute of an immaterial existence. It will be said, perhaps, that though the senses and the brain were necessarily connected with the perception of objects which existed thirty years ago, yet it does not follow from this admission, that the senses and the brain must be connected with the process of raising up ideas similar to those we once entertained. Now where is the proof of the latter assumption? How does the assumer know that it is an immaterial mind, which by its own energy raises up the idea, or produces it? Unless, then, it can be proved that it is the mind which raises up the idea, and that too without the aid of the brain, the argument advanced by the profound and erudite author of the "Reply," proves nothing but the fact which is admitted by all who have pondered on Psychological phenomena, viz. that ideas are often produced in the mind which have relation to events and circumstances which occurred thirty years ago.

We desire the reader to bear in mind that we have admitted, for the sake of argument, the existence of an immaterial principle in man, in order that even on this supposition we may shew the inconclusiveness of Mr. Brindley's reasoning. On this supposition then, we argue that for any thing that can be shown to the contrary, the power of raising up ideas belongs as much to the brain as to the mind; and therefore the fact of a man having power to raise up ideas as much proves the immateriality of the brain, as the immateriality of the mind. But we know immateriality cannot be predicated of the brain; therefore the argument is absurd.

But it will be said that in certain cases the brain is inactive, while the mind is active, and that facts of this kind prove the distinctness of the mind from the brain. Thus Mr. Brindley reasons:—

"You will be told by the Socialists, that it is folly to believe in that which you have neither seen nor heard. Then it is folly to believe in the existence of pain. Who ever saw a pain, or heard a pain, or smelt a pain, or tasted a pain? No one. Yet all have *felt* pain, and therefore all know that there is such a thing as pain, although there is the experience of four of the senses to one against such a belief. But you have done more than this, you have frequently suffered *pain mentally*, when the body felt it not."

Where is the proof of that? Here is an assumption on which the whole argument rests without even the shadow of proof! How can Mr. Brindley tell that another man's brain does not feel the pain which he denominates mental? Nay, to put it in as strong a form as he could wish, how can he tell that his own brain does not experience the pain which he denominates mental? Here we join issue with Mr. Brindley. It is on the strength of this assumption that the whole force of this part of his argument rests, and in support of which not one particle of evidence is offered, or from the nature of the thing can be offered. Yet we are called upon to subscribe to an argument which rests on an assumption, which never has been nor never can be proved! Let any person ask an experienced physician, or physiologist, a Blumenbach, or a Sir Astley Cooper, whether a man can experience strong mental pain without the brain being proportionably affected?

Brindley observes:—

"A man may have in hand some great undertaking, and may foresee failure and consequent disgrace. This will give him considerable pain; yet who will say he can see, hear, smell, taste, or feel by his sense of touch the pain that he suffers? Still he does suffer, and that too most acutely, although in this instance the whole of the physical organs of sense are unable to evidence the fact."

What fact are all the physical organs of sense unable to evidence? What does Mr. Brindley mean by the phrase "sense of touch?" and also by the phrase "*whole of the physical organs of sense?*" Does he mean merely the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and the nerves at the extremities of the body; or does he mean the whole of the organs bound up in the body of man? If Mr. Brindley means that the eye, ear, &c. cannot evidence a fact \* which is to occur at some future time, we agree with him: but if he means that the brain (which at least is the seat of perception,) cannot become conscious of future defeat, and in consequence thereof feel pain, we demand his proofs.

Brindley again observes, page 6:—

"Take one more instance of the complete independency of mental perception. A man may retire to rest, fall asleep, and in a short time begin to dream. In the space of two or three hours he travels over thousands of miles of country, sees distinctly a number of persons and objects he recognizes—transacts a multitude of business—experiences all the varied emotions of joy, hope, fear and disappointment—and at length awakes and finds *its*" [it is] "all a dream. But the impressions on his mind are so strongly marked, that for a time he can scarce persuade himself it was not reality. 'I could have sworn' says he, 'it was myself I saw; the look, the voice, the manner, all were his. And then the time, and place, and matters gone into, were to the life realities.' Now, what was it" [that] "saw, and heard, and felt so perfectly? Every sense was here locked up in sleep, all communication with the external world cut off. There were the eyes, and yet they saw not; there were the ears, and yet they heard not; there was the nose, and yet it smelt not; the palate, but it tasted not; the sense of touch, but it felt not; but then there was the mind, or soul, the personality, the independent principle, and thus he *thought*."

But was the brain inactive? Was the inner man, the thinking substance, the seat of perception, the brain, in a state of slumber? If it be an immaterial independent principle in man that dreams, then why are its ideas so incongruous, its images so fantastic, its reasonings so inaccurate, its cogitations so unconnected, as is generally the case in dreams? Why does Mr. Brindley forget to prove that the brain was in a state of inactivity while the man was dreaming? We can tell the author of the "Reply" that it is not the eye that sees, or the ear that hears, when asleep, or even when awake; but it is the brain; the eye and ear being merely the organs through the medium of which the brain is affected. But waiving this, we ask for proof as it regards the perfect inactivity of the senses, in the case of dreams. "The sound of a flute in the neighbourhood," observes Macnish, "may invoke a thousand beautiful and delightful associations. The air is perhaps filled with the tones of harps, and all other varieties of music; nay the performers themselves are visible; and while the cause of this strange scene is one trivial instrument, the dreamer may be regaled with a rich and melodious concert." Loud noises will call up various ideas and trains

\* Mr. Brindley frequently asserts that Mr. Owen is a loose and inaccurate writer. This charge may be either true or false, as circumstances may determine. It is impossible, however, for Robert Owen to be a more loose and inaccurate writer than John Brindley. Take the following as an example:—"still he does suffer, and that, too, most acutely, although in this instance the whole of the physical organs of sense are unable to evidence the fact." What fact? The fact that disgrace and ruin will be his lot? or the fact that his physical organs are unable to evidence the foregoing fact? or the fact John Brindley was probably nodding asleep when he penned the sentence? Yet this is the man who possesses "extraordinary talents" "acuteness," and all other mental qualifications! This is the man who is to beat down the strong holds of Socialism, and lay her lofty towers level with the dust!! Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha!

of ideas, respecting other loud noises, while we are asleep. Whispering into the ear has been known to occasion dreams. Now how can the senses be in a state of perfect inactivity during sleep, since through their means a noise can be heard? Be it observed, that sound is a sensation which exists in relation to a being having an organ of hearing, and not a thing which exists apart from all beings possessing auditory nerves. The air is set in motion by the vibratory movements of some body, and striking on the tympanum of the ear affects the brain in such a way as to produce the sensation or sense of sound. We admit that the senses are partially inactive while we are asleep: but we contend that it is impossible for them to be wholly inactive. A light passed rapidly before the eyes during sleep has been known to affect the brain, and cause the sleeper to awake. In this case a train of ideas has been known to pass before the mental vision in the interval between the sensation and the moment of awaking. These ideas generally relate to conflagrations or some other phenomena of which light is a prominent characteristic.

But not only are the senses of hearing and sight more or less active while we are dreaming, but the sense of touch is also sometimes active. Dr. Abercrombie furnishes us with the following instance of a dream caused by cold. "Dr. Gregory, who had been recently reading an account of Hudson's Bay, dreamt one night that he spent a winter in that part of the world, and suffered intensely from frost; and upon waking he found that he had thrown off his bed clothes during sleep." p. 276.

Heat, arising from an accumulation of bed clothes, will lead to a dream of an opposite character; the particular ideas associated with the sensations of heat which come in to make up the scenes, being dependent, as in the case of Dr. Gregory's dream, on particular circumstances. The same Dr. Gregory having applied a bottle of *hot water to his feet* one night, in consequence of indisposition, dreamt that he was walking up Mount Ætna, and felt the ground under him warm. Dr. Reid, having, one night, a blister applied to his head, dreamed that he was scalped by a party of Indians.—*Abercrombie id; Stewart's "Phil. Hum. Mind," vol. 1, p. 335.*

"Sensations in the alimentary canal," observes a writer in the *Penny Cyclopædia*, "sometimes pleasurable and sometimes painful, have a very important influence on dreams. These sensations, indeed, influence very considerably our waking trains of ideas; and much more, inasmuch as in sleep there are no external objects to call us away from the ideas which these sensations call up, do they influence our sleeping trains. When the digestion is good, and we have ate nothing which weighs upon or disagrees with the stomach, our dreams are, generally speaking, pleasurable. When, on the other hand, we suffer from indigestion, which, in respect of the effect, is but a name for an aggregate of painful sensations in the alimentary canal, we are afflicted with dreams of the most painful character. The exhilarating effects of opium and intoxicating draughts, which effects are neither more nor less than sensations in the alimentary canal, are also discernable in dreams. And in connection with this topic, we may allude to the dreams caused by the uneasy sensations attendant on obstructed respiration, which is sometimes caused by, and sometimes combined with, indigestion, constituting the most dreadful evils to which in sleep we are subject, and which are known to all under the name of night mare."

It must be evident, then, that dreams instead of proving the complete independency of "mental perception," lead to an opposite inference. For

in many of the foregoing instances, the senses were more or less active previous to the time when the train of ideas constituting the dream became present to the mind. To talk, therefore, of the mental perceptions being independent of external or internal physical causes, while at the same time it is obvious, as far as observation enables us to conclude, that external or internal physical causes preceded the rising of the train of ideas, and actually called the train of ideas up by the law of association, is to talk nonsense. For if a physical cause of mental perceptions be observable in any case specified, it is obvious that the mental perceptions cannot be independent of the cause that produced them. But whether physical causes operate in producing mental perceptions or not, it is manifest that Mr. Brindley writes inaccurately when he speaks of the "complete independency of mental perception." Because mental perception is not a thing which exists by and of itself, but is merely the act of, or the effects produced by, a percipient being. But Mr. Brindley in one place speaks of the independency of the perceptions, and in another place of the independency of the being that perceives. It is manifest that if the fact of dreaming involves the inferences drawn from it by the author of the "Reply," it must be the independency of the *percipient*, and not the independency of the perceptions, which is to be inferred. But Mr. Brindley infers both, which is absurd: for the mental perceptions cannot be independent of the percipient being that is their subject; or he infers the independency of the percipient being only; and therefore writes inaccurately respecting the independency of the "mental perceptions."

In order to shew the absurdity of attempting to prove the independency of the percipient, by the fact of dreaming, it is only necessary to name the qualifications which the reasoner should possess in order to enable him to execute such a mighty task.

First.—He ought to know that the senses are locked up in a state not of partial, but of perfect inactivity during sleep.

Second.—He ought to know that if the senses are only partially inactive, that no external physical causes, such as vibrations in the air producing sounds, or the contact of the bed clothes, &c., have operated upon them so as to become the exciting cause of the dream. Or,

Third.—If he asserts that what is usually called the senses, are perfectly inactive during the process of dreaming, he ought to know that the brain and nervous system are inactive, so far as the process of dreaming is concerned. And

Fourth.—If he possesses not a knowledge of the foregoing things, he ought to know, independent of the fact of dreaming as it now takes place, that it is an immaterial personality that dreams. For unless he can prove *a priori*, that it is an immaterial personality that can alone dream; or unless he can prove that the senses, the brain, the nervous system generally, are perfectly inactive during the process of dreaming, he is not warranted by any principle of sound reasoning, to infer from the fact of dreaming the existence of an immaterial, independent, percipient being that dreams.

Now where is the man who assumes the possession of this knowledge? How can John Brindley prove that the senses are wholly inactive during sleep? Nay, how can he prove that they are not less inactive when we dream, than when we are in a sound sleep, and do not dream? How can he prove that the brain is not active? How can he prove that there is no

connection between physical causes and the train of ideas which constitutes the dream? Let him answer these questions satisfactorily, and then, but not till then, will the Socialists receive his *dictum* as an authority, and be disposed to consider his arguments conclusive.

But to return to Mr. Brindley's main argument; in considering which, we have already stated, that certain things are deserving of special attention. One of these is the manner in which the remembrance of events may be perpetuated. Let the reader bear in mind that Mr. Brindley states a fact, and then starts an hypothesis to account for this fact. The fact is, that ideas similar to those we entertained thirty years ago, are rendered present to the mind; the hypothesis is, that as the *material* of the body is changed several times during the thirty years, the subject of ideas must remain unchanged, i. e. must be an immaterial entity or spirit. It is the difficulty of accounting for the fact, which makes Mr. Brindley's hypothesis appear plausible. We shall therefore proceed to account for this fact on another hypothesis, and adduce illustrations as we proceed.

First.—It is obvious that the particles of matter added to the body, acquire the properties which those thrown off lose in consequence of being separated from the compound. This is so obvious that it requires no proof.

Second.—It is obvious that the same, or nearly the same, form and organization of the human frame is kept up, even though the material of the body is constantly changing.

Third.—It is equally obvious that the powers resulting from this organization of the material are preserved. Thus the material of my present self is not the material which lived and moved eighteen years ago, as my *THEN* self; but my power of motion is similar now to what it was eighteen years ago. The material of my limbs has changed twice during that period, but the power of walking has been preserved entire and throughout. The material of my stomach has been changed as well as the material of my limbs, but the power of digestion still remains. This renders it clear that the fresh particles of matter assimilated to the frame acquire properties similar to those which the particles thrown off lose when separated from it.

Now assuming, for the sake of argument, that the power of thinking belongs to the organized material of our bodies, it follows that it, as well as the other powers of the body will remain as long as the organization is preserved in the same state. There are many things which tend to perpetuate the remembrance of events; many circumstances which operate upon us tending to call up at different intervals the image of the past. As for example: the man who is supposed to leave his country or his native village, is doubtless very often reminded, during the course of the thirty years, of persons and objects he had there been familiar with. The thoughts and feelings produced in him by the circumstances of his departure, arise we will suppose, at the end of two months; indeed it is probable that similar ideas will be called up many times during the two months; and surely his body has not undergone a complete change in that short period? The sight of a person having features similar to the loved and lost one, or of a place having similar characteristics to the village he has forsaken, or the sound of a voice resembling the voice of the one that has been left behind, may serve to call up, by association, a host of ideas similar to those once entertained. And this process is repeated often, very often, during a man's life.

Take another illustration of the manner in which the remembrance of

events may be perpetuated. Mr. Brindley sometimes informs his auditory that when a boy, he used to be engaged to tell tales to his school-fellows, at a halfpenny a tale. Now there can be no doubt that the remembrance of this event has been kept alive in him, in consequence of varied circumstances calling up ideas of it in his mind at different periods of his life. As for instance:—he has told this tale many times during the last two years, and doubtless has often thought of it during that period. Besides his constant practice of story-telling will tend to perpetuate the remembrance of the manner in which he commenced his career as a story teller. Now every time that his brain is set in motion, or, if you will, every time his thinking principle is caused to think of this particular event, an impression is made, or may be made, on his organization. And as this remembrance is called up many times during seven years, it follows that the remembrance of an event may be perpetuated, without supposing the existence of an immaterial principle, unchangeable in substance, and of an immortal nature. On this hypothesis then, the fact of remembrance can be accounted for; as well as on the hypothesis adopted by Mr. Brindley. But it is the difficulty of accounting for the fact which leads Mr. Brindley to assume the existence of an immaterial soul; and as this difficulty is obviated by an hypothesis directly the reverse of Mr. Brindley's, it follows that Mr. Brindley's assumption may be true, or it may not be true; inasmuch as it does not follow from the fact of a theory accounting for a phenomenon, or class of phenomena, that *the theory is true*.

The sophistry of Mr. Brindley's argument is so palpably evident, that it is impossible to read six or seven lines without perceiving it. Thus alluding to the changes which the body undergoes, he observes,

"Yet the same mind or soul, the same personality has outlived them all: then must the soul be immortal as well as immaterial, which is proved even by reference to this life alone. It now outlives body after body that dies away by degrees; it will by-and-bye outlive a body that shall die away by the stroke of death all at once."—*Brind. Reply*, p. 5.

Where is the proof of that? The body has changed; that is, the material of the body has been thrown out of the system, and fresh material has constantly been substituted for that ejected from the body. This fresh material acquires the properties which the ejected matter possessed when in the compound. Thus the organization has been kept up, even though the material of it undergoes a change. The immaterial principle is supposed to be united to the organized body. But does this warrant the inference, that when the organization becomes entirely destroyed and broken up and dissolved by the stroke of death, the immaterial principle will continue to exist? Assuredly not. The analogy is incomplete, and therefore the inference unwarranted. The argument may be thus stated: the immaterial soul in this life, is always connected with an organization, therefore, when the organization is entirely destroyed, the soul will continue to exist. Who, does not perceive the gross and palpable sophistry of Mr. Brindley's argument?

But the positive nonsense of the following, outrivals the sophistry of the preceding remarks, cited from our author's reply:

"In this life the material body is necessary, that through it the immaterial principle may be manifested to a material world; but in the land of spirits—in the eternal world of glory we shall then know even as also we are known." "For this corruptible shall put on incorruption, this mortal put on immortality."—*Ibid*.

Here it is assumed that the material body is necessary, that through it the immaterial principle may be manifested to a material world. What! is a

material world capable of perceiving an immaterial spirit? Then it must have power to perceive the manifestation! But how can this be, on the principles assumed by Mr. Brindley? What material world does Mr. Brindley allude to? Does he mean the world consisting of the bodies of men? or the material world consisting of the bodies of other animals? or the material world consisting of both? or the material world on which they tread, and which supports them in being? or does he mean all these collectively? He certainly must mean some one or all of these. But if matter be incapable of thought and consciousness, then how can it perceive the manifestations of an immaterial spirit? Perception certainly implies the consciousness of having perceived. But that which is conscious of having perceived a thing, may also become conscious of its own existence. Now consciousness, and the power of perception, are attributes of what men denominate *mind*; hence matter can possess the attributes of mind; in which case there is no necessity to multiply causes to account for psychological phenomena, when one will suffice; or matter cannot possess the attributes of mind, and therefore, as it perceives, must be mind itself; so that matter is mind, and mind is matter, which on Mr. Brindley's principles is a downright absurdity.

When, therefore, Mr. Brindley speaks of the material body being necessary, that through it the immaterial principle may be manifested to a material world, he must mean either that the material world has powers of perception; in which case matter possesses one of the attributes of that we denominate *mind*: or he means that the material organization is necessary, that through it the immaterial principle may be manifested to itself, or to other immaterial principles. In the former instance he contradicts himself; for it is self-evident that one thing cannot be manifested to another thing, unless that other thing possess power to perceive the manifestation; and if that other thing possess the power of mental perception, it must be either an immaterial principle itself, or it must be the subject of a mental attribute. If the thing that perceives the manifestation be an immaterial existence, then it is absurd on the part of John Brindley to call it a material world in contradistinction to an immaterial world; and if it be really material, and yet has no power to perceive the manifestation of an immaterial principle, then it is absurd for Mr. Brindley to attempt to prove the existence of an immaterial principle from certain psychological phenomena, which, by his own admission, may be characteristic of a material world. For, if perception belong to matter, so must the consciousness of having perceived; and, if so, how can Mr. Brindley prove that all other mental attributes do not belong to it also? This, then, is rather an unfortunate admission for Mr. Brindley, but it is one he was compelled, no doubt, reluctantly, to make.

But, if it be said that the material body is necessary, in order that through it the immaterial principle may be manifested to itself and to other spirits, the inferences emergent from this assumption are equally awkward with the former. For, if the material body be necessary, in order that the immaterial spirit may be manifested to itself, *i. e.* in order that it may become conscious of its own existence, then it may be inferred, and justly too, that the spirit, when separated from the body, cannot be conscious of its own existence—nor can it be manifested to other spirits, because the material body which is necessary to the manifestation is absent. Of what use then is immortality? Of no use or importance whatever. Mr. Brindley may take the argument either way; for it makes against him in both.

At page 5, Mr. Brindley observes:—

"Before going to the second question proposed for our consideration, it may be well to observe two or three things connected with what has been advanced. First—it will be seen, that by personality is not to be understood the bodily organs, but that which governs those organs and sets them in motion. A child may be severely beaten, and suffer much pain from the punishment inflicted, and yet, from obstinacy, remain immoveable. The inducements to remove the body, or that part of it that received the blows, may be very great; but, unless his personality sets the body in motion, there it must continue until beaten to death if the punishment goes on. A man may hold up his finger and command it to move, yet, however loudly he may call upon it, it will remain motionless unless his personality move it. So again he may insist on its preserving an erect position, and many times repeat the request, but the finger will, notwithstanding, move backwards and forwards in defiance of his language, so long as his personality shall continue it in motion. This may seem a very simple illustration, but is one the materialist can never reply to. What obliges the finger to remain erect when it is ordered to move, and to move when it is requested to preserve its erect position, are questions which no materialist ever could or ever can answer. You must go to the independent immaterial principle above referred to for a reasonable explanation of the phenomenon."

The foregoing quotation contains the best practical nonsense ever offered to the world in the form of an argument. It is first assumed, that the immaterial principle governs the bodily organs. It is assumed in the second place, that the finger will not move but in accordance with the dictates of the personality or immaterial principle. And it is assumed in the third place, that no materialist ever could or ever can answer the question, "What is it that sets the finger in motion?" All these assumptions are unsupported by proof, or any thing like proof. It will be admitted, at all events, that unless the first can be proved, every one of the rest either may be, or must be, false: for it is on the strength of the first they are based. The fact is, the brain, or thinking power, withholds the volition which would move the finger, and therefore language does not affect it; because the finger is not organized to perceive and act of itself, but is merely a part of a system which is organized to perceive and think and act of itself. Physiology proves that there are nerves in the body whose office it is to carry, or transmit, the impressions made by external objects on different parts of the body to the brain; and that there are other nerves whose office it is to transmit the volition from the brain to the other organs of the body. The finger, therefore, remains motionless, or moves backwards and forwards in accordance with the impulse transmitted from the brain to it. But does this by any means prove that it is an immaterial principle that first moves the brain and through it the finger? No, it does not; but until this can be proved the argument is good for nothing.

But this argument, if it deserves the name, proves too much, and therefore is useless to the cause it is brought forward to support. You may command a dog to lift his foot, a horse to shake his head, an elephant to cough, an oyster to open his shell or a louse to crawl; but none of them will obey you unless they will to do so. The dog's foot, the horse's head, the elephant's larynx, the oyster's shell, and the limbs of the louse, will all remain motionless unless the animals will them to move. What is it that makes the organs of such animals move? Is it their brain? Then the brain of an animal has power to will, and the body of the animal is so organised that the volition of the brain is transmitted from the head to the extremities of the animal's body, and the organs move in consequence. Is it a 'soul—an immaterial personality or principle, that moves the organ, or first wills the moving of the organ? Then all animals must have souls, immaterial personalities or principles, within their bodies; and, therefore, all animals must be immortal. We do not perceive how Mr. Brindley can escape from the horns of this dilemma.

It appears to us that he must adopt some one or other of the following suppositions.

First.—That the animal in moving an organ of its body, does not will the movement of it. In this case we demand proof of the supposition. We require the supposer to show how the animal of its own accord, can lift its foot, or move any other part of its body, without at the same time, willing such movement. Or

Second.—That the brain of an animal is so organized, that it can will to lift its foot, or move a part of its body; or will that these organs shall remain in a state of rest. In this case, the possibility of a piece of organized matter, willing what movements shall be performed by the extremities of its body is admitted; and therefore the whole force of Mr. Brindley's fingery argument is destroyed. Mr. Brindley's argument is, that the finger remains erect and motionless, as long as the personality wills it to remain so; but that as soon as the personality wills it to move, it moves. Now the question is, what is personality? What is it that moves the finger? What is its nature? And how does it operate? If Mr. Brindley adopts the hypothesis we speak of in this paragraph, in relation to animals, he must admit that phenomena precisely similar to that he adduces, are produced by causes which are not immaterial, independent, personal beings. This argument, therefore, loses all its force; for if the foot of a horse remains motionless untill the animal wills it to move; and if the horse, though destitute of an immaterial soul, be so organized that it can will the movements of its foot; so may man be destitute of an immaterial soul and yet be so organized as to will the movements of his finger or any other part of his frame.

Third.—If neither of the foregoing suppositions be adopted, Mr. Brindley must come to the conclusion that as similar phenomena are justly attributable to similar causes, and as the movements of a man's finger are attributable to the power which an immaterial principle exercises over the body, so the movements of a horse's foot or any other organ of his body are justly attributable to the same sort of cause. Hence horses must have immaterial souls; and as those things which have no parts cannot be decomposed, so the souls of horses must be immortal. But if horses are immortal, then all animals, indeed every thing which has life and can will the movement of its organs, must also be immortal. The horse, the flea, the bug, the beetle, and the cock-chaffer, as well as the mighty elephant and potent rhinoceros, are all immaterial and immortal beings. There is no possibility of evading this conclusion, unless we admit that the case brought forward by Mr. Brindley does not prove that which wills or decides the movements of a human finger to be immaterial and immortal.

We pass over the first paragraph at page seven of the "Reply," because we do not contend that because the scars on a person's body preserve their form while the material of the body changes, therefore they must be immaterial and immortal. The continuance of the form of the scars which may be on the frame of man, only proves that the human structure retains the same FORM, while the *material* of which it is composed is constantly changing.

But the next paragraph contains an objection which has, according to Mr. Brindley's admission, a greater show of reason in its favour than the former:—

"The second objection, and the one which has the greater shew of reason in its favour, is that drawn from the instinctive habits of animals. A horse, say they, will again recognize his stable

after an absence of eight or ten years ; therefore the horse possesses an immortal soul ! Here again the analogy is false and the argument vicious. The analogy is false, for the mind of man can recollect events and circumstances when the objects themselves are far removed from his observation ; but who ever heard of a horse turning over in his mind, after a lapse of years, the adventures of the chase or the battle field. The argument is vicious, for the moment we ask them to prove that a horse can mentally recall ideas in the absence of those things to which they relate, the whole argument falls to the ground. Either they assume that a horse has a reasonable soul, and therefore reflects upon the past, because a reasonable soul always forms such reflections ; or else they assume that a horse reflects, and therefore, has a soul, because reflection can only come from a reasonable soul. The truth is, they have ignorantly confounded two distinct operations, whence the incorrectness of their reasoning. They have made recognition and recollection to be the same. They have assumed that to recognize an object through the external organs of sense, when it is again present to the senses, is the same as to recollect ideas concerning objects that are not present. The external organs of sense, like the marks on the face are ever with us, though the material is constantly changing. Hence men and animals can instinctively recognize good or evil in objects that have before affected them ; but it belongs to man alone *mentally* to review ideas apart from the things they represent."

The preceding quotation embodies sentiments so palpably absurd and ridiculous as to reflect disgrace on even the intellect of John Brindley. In the first place, it is admitted that an animal can recognise the habitation it has formerly dwelt in, or the objects which it has formerly seen, when those objects are again presented to its senses. But how can an animal do this when the material of its body has been changed ? There are instances on record of animals recognising objects after an absence of eight, ten, or twelve years. Now the material of the animal's body has been changed in the course of that time. This must be admitted. How then can the phenomenon of recognition be accounted for ? To say that the senses are always present with the animal is to say a truth ; but the admission of this truth by no means accounts for the phenomenon in question. It were down right folly to say that the animal recognises an object which it has seen or heard ten or twelve years ago, for the body that then recognised has passed away, and a new body has supplied its place. This new body recognises an object which it never saw before. How can this be ? If it recognises the object must it not be conscious in some way or other of having seen it before. But how can this consciousness, or knowledge, or recognition, be accounted for on the supposition that the animal is merely an organised material structure ? Can mere matter recognise, perceive, and know ? It either can or it cannot. If it can recognise, perceive, and know, when in the form of an animal, it can also recognise, perceive, and know, when in the form of a man. And if it cannot, then there must be in both man and animals something that is of a nature different to material substance.

But it will be said that a horse cannot recollect ideas, while man has the power of recollecting ideas when the objects they represent are absent, that is, when they are not placed before the man so as to make an impression on his organs of sense.

"The mind of man can recollect events and circumstances when the objects themselves are far removed from his observation ; but who ever heard of a horse turning over in his mind the events of the chase or the battle field."\*

\* The pitifulness of the assumption made by Mr. Brindley is almost self-evident. Who can tell that a horse does not recollect ideas ? Who can tell what is the nature of a horse's feelings, without becoming a horse, and experiencing the feelings of a horse. Nay, more ; in order that we may point out definitively the difference between the ideas which a horse *may* entertain, and the ideas which a man *does* entertain, it is necessary either that we first become a horse, and afterwards a man, and possess in our second state a distinct recollection of the ideas we had in the former, so as that we should be able to compare the two, and note their resemblances, and mark their difference ; or, it is necessary that we should be both horse and man at the same

We retort, who can prove that a horse does not turn over in his mind the events alluded to by Mr. Brindley? How does Mr. Brindley know that the horse does not recollect in nearly a similar way to that in which man recollects the events which have occurred to him? When an assumption is made the basis of an argument, it ought to be self-evident, or proof of its truth should be advanced by the person who builds his argument upon it. But Mr. Brindley assumes that a horse can not turn over in his mind the events of the chase or the battle field; and without attempting to shew the correctness of the assumption, reasons from it as if it were correct. This is reasoning with a vengeance! To use Mr. Brindley's language:—

"The argument is vicious, for the moment we ask him to prove that a horse" can "not mentally recall ideas, in the absence of those things to which they relate, the whole argument falls to the ground."

Mr. Brindley further asserts that materialists assume

"Either that a horse has a reasonable soul, and therefore reflects upon the past, because a reasonable soul always forms such reflections; or else they assume that a horse reflects, and therefore, has a soul, because reflection can only come from a reasonable soul."

If by the ambiguous phrase, reasonable soul, is meant an *immaterial* and immortal entity, or spirit, we deny the truth of Mr. Brindley's statement altogether. Materialists do not assume, unless it be for the sake of argument, the existence of an immaterial soul at all, either in man or in animals. Such an assumption would be contrary to their acknowledged principles. The fact is, they assert that the arguments of immaterialists prove the existence of an immaterial spirit in animals as well as in man.

The advocates of supernaturalism contend that thought, consciousness, memory, &c., occurring in relation to man, proves the immateriality of that which thinks in man; and their opponents, the materialists, finding the same phenomena occurring in relation to animals, contend that they prove the existence of an immaterial soul as much in the latter case as the former. This, therefore, is all they assume. But Mr. Brindley asserts that they assume that a reasonable soul can alone be the subject of reflection. Granted—but what does Mr. Brindley mean by the phrase "reasonable soul?" Does he mean merely the subject of the phenomena mentioned? We grant this also. But if he means by the phrase "reasonable soul," an immaterial, impalpable, indiscerptible, immortal entity, or spirit, we deny that materialists ever assumed, as certain, the existence of such a thing. In fact, if they assume it at all they merely assume it, as we have done, for the sake of shewing the incorrectness of the assumption.

If Mr. Brindley could bring forward one single instance wherein the brain of any animal is similarly organized to the brain of man, while at the same time the man possesses mental attributes which the animal does not, we would admit it as fact favourable to his views. But this cannot be done, and for this simple reason: no such similarity between the brains of men and animals exists. For if the brain of an animal organized like man, yet of a

time, in order that we may be able to know whether a horse can mentally recall ideas or not. If mere observation is to be taken as a guide, then we have proof positive that animals can remember things which are not present to their senses. The numerous instances of dogs returning home after a long absence, is a proof that they can remember the place to which they return, even when it is not present to the senses. A friend of mine has a dog which will find its way from any part of London, to the house in which its master resides. Is the house present to the animal's external organs of sense? I once knew a dog travel a distance of twenty two miles to its home, and that without guide or compass. Did the house, twenty two miles off, operate on the dog's external organs of sense? But then dogs have no memory! They merely recognize objects when they are present to their senses. *Proh Puder!*

different species to man, could be produced, we should, on the principles of materialism, be justified in expecting that both would exhibit similar powers of reflection, perception and volition. But if, after examination, we found in the man loftier attributes than in the other animal, while at the same time the organizations of both were similar, then we should at once conclude that there was something in the man independent of the material particles which entered into the composition of his frame. But no such phenomena can be brought forward, because no such phenomena exist. As long, therefore, as the brains of men are differently organized to the brains of other animals, we are warranted to conclude that it is this difference in the organization which produces the difference of mental powers.

But it will perhaps be said that this is pure assumption, totally unsupported by facts; and that in order to nullify its force, it is only necessary to assume the opposite. The difference, however, between the two assumptions is this: the former assumption is founded on facts, or rather an induction from facts; while the latter is not. In order to shew proof of this, we may observe:—

First.—Perception, reflection, judgment, and all other mental operations are always experienced in ourselves, and always observed by ourselves, in connection with an organized physical structure.

Second.—The sciences of physiology and anatomy prove that there is a marked difference between the size, shape, and conformation of the brains of men, and the size, shape, and conformation of the brains of other animals.

Third.—There is a marked difference as it regards the size, shape, and weight of the brains of men; and there is also a marked difference as it regards the grasp of their intellects.

Fourth.—The brains of idiots differ from the brains of ordinary men, both in size, shape, and weight; and it is well known that there is as great a difference between idiots and men generally, in point of intellectual power, as there is in point of physical organization.

Fifth.—If the brain be destroyed, life ceases; and as far as observation enables us to conclude, consciousness, thought, and feeling cease also.

Sixth.—If the brain be partially injured the intellect becomes proportionately defective.

Seven.—An increased flow of blood to the brain renders the memory more perfect. This is often instanced in cases of fevers, and other diseases which powerfully affect the head.

Eighth.—Ricketty children have minds active and penetrating; their wit is astonishing; they are susceptible of lively passions, and have perspicacity which does not belong to their age. Their brains enlarge in the same manner as their cranium does.\*

Ninth.—A severe blow upon the head deprives us of all consciousness of existence.

Tenth.—The brains of great thinkers are wonderfully large when contrasted with the brains of other men. It has also been found by admeasurement, that they continue to enlarge until the subjects are fifty years of age, and long after the other portions of the system have ceased to increase."†

Eleventh.—In cases of insanity, the intellect is disordered; and it has been proved by innumerable *post-mortem* examinations of the brains of lunatics, that their brains exhibit symptoms of disease.

\* Dictionnaire des Sciences Medicales vol. xlv.

† Dictionnaire des Sciences, Medicales, vol. 22. Art. Hydrocephale.

Now we ask, do not all these facts warrant us to conclude that it is the brain that thinks, or is the subject of thought. For how can physical causes operate on an immaterial spirit which, having no parts, can present no point of contact to that which is material. Can Mr. Brindley bring forward a host of facts of this description in proof of his assumption,—that it is an immaterial, impalpable, imponderable substance that thinks and wills in man?

We have already extended our examination of Mr. Brindley's argument on this subject, to a much greater length than we originally intended. It is time, therefore, that we should bring this part of the subject to a close. Prior to doing this, however, we submit to the notice of the advocates of supernaturalism, the following questions:—

First.—How can the powers of an immaterial spirit be destroyed, or even suspended, by the operations of a physical cause, when the immaterial spirit, being destitute of parts, can present no point of contact to the operating substance?

Second.—How can the power of thinking, the power of consciousness, and the power of recollecting ideas, be exclusively the attributes of an immaterial spirit, when facts prove that an injury done to the brain destroys, at least for a time, these powers?

Third.—Since facts prove that the brain is the material organ by which all the mental faculties are manifested, ought it not to be considered as much the subject of mental attributes, as a supposed immaterial principle? And if the mere existence of these attributes proves the immateriality of the soul, does it not equally prove the immateriality of the brain: the brain and soul combined, being the substratum of such attributes?

Fourth.—Is it not absurd for Henry Brougham, and others, to assert that we have stronger proof for the existence of mind, than we have for the existence of matter; when the point in dispute is not the existence of something that thinks, but the *nature* of that something, i. e. whether it be an organized material structure, or an immaterial spirit?

Fifth.—If the power of thought, and that of recollecting ideas, be exclusively the attributes of an immaterial spirit, how can the fact be accounted for, that the measure of these powers depends upon the development of a man's brain? Is there not a marked difference between the brain of a *Newton* and the brain of an *idiot*?—and is there not also a marked difference between the mental grasp of the one, and the mental grasp of the other?

Sixth.—How can it be proved, that what is usually denominated mental pain, is not a painful excitement of the brain?

Seventh.—How can the powers of an immaterial spirit increase, since they are the attributes of that which is indivisible? Do they not increase as man advances towards mature age? Are the mental powers of the infant equal to the mental powers of the full-grown man?

Eighth.—How can the attributes of an immaterial spirit become disordered?—are they not disordered when the individual becomes insane, or begins to doat in old age?

Ninth.—How can it be proved, that in any given movement of an organ of the body, it is an immaterial spirit that first moves the brain, and through it the organ affected?

Tenth.—If in this life, the immaterial soul is always connected with a material organization, how can it be proved that the immaterial soul will continue to have a conscious existence when it is entirely separated from the organization?

Eleventh.—How are immaterial souls produced? Do parents propagate the souls of their children as well as their bodies? If parents propagate the souls of their children, must not the soul of the child be divided from the soul of the parent? And, if so, must not the soul of the parent be divisible. How then can it be indiscrptible and immortal?

Twelfth.—If parents do not propagate the souls of their offspring, and as it is assumed that souls exist, must they not be created by God, or by some other power? Can God, who is holy, create a soul that is depraved? Have souls been created all at once; or are they created respectively as occasion requires? If the former, where do they exist until they are wanted? And if the latter, at what time during the process of gestation are they joined to the body?

Thirteenth.—Have idiots, abortions, and monsters, as they are called, souls?

Fourteenth.—Does not the fact of an animal recognising an object eight or ten years after it has seen it, imply the consciousness or recollection of having seen it before? And if the possession of this power in man proves him to be immortal, does not the possession of this power in an animal prove it to be immortal?

Fifteenth.—How can we tell whether an animal can recall ideas when the objects they represent are absent or not?

Sixteenth.—If John Brindley had any regard for the eternal welfare of his immaterial soul, would he be guilty of the shifts and subterfuges, the equivocation and meanness and the varied species of clap-trap oratory which has been so frequently exhibited by him in his discussional career?

Here we close our list of questions. We do not propose them to men of science, because men of science who are engaged in the acquirement of positive knowledge, can find more noble employment than that of examining such questions as the foregoing. We only propose them to immaterialists, in order to show that their favourite doctrine is a thousand times more absurd, and a thousand times more ridiculous than the doctrine of the materialists. The foregoing are questions which no immaterialist "ever could, or ever can satisfactorily answer."

Mr. Brindley observes, at page eight of his reply:—

We will now proceed to the second part of our argument, which is to prove, that "*there MUST OF NECESSITY exist a personal and intelligent God.*"

"To accommodate the argument to those who unhappily deny the existence of such a Being, it is proposed that in this instance it shall be discussed on principles of reason and philosophy alone."

After having waded through seven pages of sophisticated absurdity, it affords us some pleasure to recognise at the eighth page, the announcement we have just quoted. The question we are about to examine is to be discussed on principles of reason and philosophy alone.

This question is not whether there is a personal and intelligent God; but whether Mr. Brindley has proved that there is one. We do not, therefore, in this work deny the existence of a God; of a personal, conscious, intelligent God; of any God; the Jupiter of the Romans; the Zeus of the Greeks; the Jehovah of the Hebrews; or the Bramha of the Hindús. We only contend that Mr. Brindley has not proved that a personal, conscious, intelligent deity must of necessity exist,—nay, that he has not, so far as the arguments advanced by him are concerned, even rendered the existence of such a being

probable. We believe it is impossible to prove a negative; at least it is impossible to demonstrate a negative. We hold it therefore to be absurd to deny the existence of a personal, conscious, intelligent God, when we cannot advance the reasons on which our denial is founded. Were we confirmed atheists, we would at once avow our opinions and stand or fall by them; but as we are only sceptical on the point, we shall neither assert the positive nor the negative, but confine ourselves to the province of the argumentative critic, and examine the arguments advanced by John Brindley.

And first we would remark that Henry Lord Brougham, in his Discourse on Natural Theology, asserts that we have stronger evidence for the existence of mind than we have for the existence of matter. This assertion may be admitted; but then it is to be admitted with caution, because much more is intended to be conveyed by it than a superficial reasoner would suppose. Every person will admit that there is something that perceives, recollects, and is conscious: but this assumption involves not the further assumption, that that something is entirely distinct in nature from material substance. The great point in dispute between materialists and immaterialists is, not that *something exists* which possesses attributes denominated mental, but whether that thinking thing be an organized material body, or an indivisible immortal spirit. Now mark the craft of Lord Brougham in reasoning upon this subject. He first endeavours to reason his readers into a belief that there is stronger evidence for the existence of mind than for the existence of matter; then he understands *mind* to signify an indivisible, immaterial spirit, and afterwards endeavours to prove that it is because we are conscious of possessing a power of designing ourselves, the subject of which power is an immaterial spirit, that we suppose there are marks of design in the productions of nature; which marks of design imply the existence of a designing power, the subject of which is an "*immense*," and immaterial being or spirit. In this mode of conducting the argument, we perceive the hand, of a master sophist. But though the argument is clever, it is but a sophism after all; for if we understand by the term *mind*, simply the basis or subject of memory, consciousness, and designing power, we shall only be warranted to infer the existence of something which designed the universe; and as we have never seen *mind* or designing power but in connection with a material organized structure, so we are only warranted (by Lord Brougham's method of reasoning) to infer the existence of an immense organized material being, who, out of nothing, created, or out of previously-existing materials made, this beautiful world and all that it inherit.

We pass over the fifth paragraph at page eight, which speaks of the ancient schools of philosophy, and their speculations respecting the eternity of matter, because we feel confident that the Author of the Reply knows very little about the philosophy of the ancients; and because further, the speculations of ancient philosophers have but little to do with the present argument.

At page eight Mr. Brindley observes:—

"It will at once be evident, that matter must be in its atoms what it is as a whole, *since combination does not change the principle*, but merely affects its relative power."

Was ever writing more vague than this? What does Mr. Brindley mean by "matter being in its atoms what it is as a whole?" Does he mean that an atom of matter, in the shape of an alkali, is the same as the world we inhabit—the same as an atom of matter in the form of an acid, or the same as the whole material universe? Does he mean that an acid is the same as

an alkali, or *vice versa*? Or does he mean that the compound body produced by the combination of the two bodies we have mentioned has the same properties as the bodies which unite to form it had previous to their combination? If he means any or all of these things by the phraseology he uses, then we contradict him from our own knowledge of the science of chemistry. But, Mr. Brindley, who evidently knows as much of chemistry as a horse knows about the planetary bodies, asserts that "it will at once be evident that matter must be in its atoms what it is as a whole; since combination does not change the principle, but merely affects its relative power." Why is this to be "at once evident"? because Mr. Brindley, the learned, the scientific, the redoubtable Mr. Brindley chooses to assert that "combination does not change the principle, but merely affects its relative power." What does Mr. Brindley mean by changing the principle of matter? And what does he know about the combinations of material bodies? Nothing; literally nothing. Yet we are, forsooth, to receive a dogma on the authority of his *ipse dixit*. *Proh pudor*!

At page nine Mr. Brindley observes:—

"The whole, therefore, of these contradictory creeds may be thus replied to:—matter could not be either essentially eternal and intelligent, or essentially eternal and unintelligent, because it is not uniformly either one or the other.

First.—"It could not be essentially eternal and intelligent; for, then are we constantly meeting with unintelligent compounds, as stones, earths, &c., resulting from intelligent atoms; which is absurd: for the mere aggregation of materials, so far from destroying a principle, would increase its intensity.

Second.—"It could not be essentially eternal and unintelligent; for then are we equally in a dilemma with regard to man himself, where intelligence is so plainly traced and so universally admitted; and we should be driven to the opposite absurdity of unintelligent atoms, producing by mere accumulation an intelligent principle.

"To what conclusion, then, are we inevitably driven? since it has been proved that some material compounds are endowed with intelligence, while others are altogether destitute of such a principle; and since it has also been shewn, that matter, in itself, is neither intelligent nor unintelligent—are we not of necessity compelled to acknowledge that there must be in existence some great intelligent power, that could give to matter, or withhold from matter, intelligence at his will? which intelligent power is the power we call God."

The whole of the foregoing argument is built upon two assumptions, the truth of which never has been nor can be proved; and which are directly at variance with the deductions of chemical philosophy. Though we are fully aware of the source whence Mr. Brindley borrowed this hacknied sophism; yet it is not with its originality, but with its force and truth we are now concerned.

The two assumptions on which the strength of this argument is founded are these:—

First.—"Matter must be in its atoms what it is as a whole." And

Second.—"The mere aggregation of particles instead of destroying a principle, would increase its intensity."

These propositions are stated so ambiguously by the champion of logic and orthodoxy, that it is difficult to know what meaning the writer wishes us to attach to the phraseology he uses. Are we to understand that matter is in its atoms what it is as a whole as it regards its essence? Then how can we tell or prove that such is the case when we know nothing of the essence of matter—nay more, since we cannot conceive the idea of matter without, at the same time, conceiving the idea of some of its general properties?—Does Mr. Brindley mean that an atom of matter is similar in all respects, save degree, to a compound of atoms and to all the varied compounds which

form the garniture of our world? Then we say at once his statements are false, because they are not merely unwarranted by facts but directly opposed to them. We might ask also for an explanation of the terms made use of in Mr. Brindley's second assumption, for it is equally as difficult to comprehend as the first. What does Mr. Brindley mean by the word principle as applied to matter? Does he mean the form of matter? or the colour of matter? or all the general properties of matter? or the peculiar qualities which matter derives from its combination with other portions of matter? Does he mean all, any, or none of these things? We confess it is very difficult to understand him on account of his ambiguity, nevertheless, we shall endeavour as far as possible to catch his meaning.

#### ASSUMPTION FIRST.

*"Matter must be in its atoms, what it is as a whole."*

As Mr. Brindley does not attempt to advance proof of this assumption, it would be sufficient for our purpose to make a counter assumption, and let the matter rest there; because one assumption is as good as another. We deem it of importance, however, to consider this point more elaborately.

When we speak of matter as a whole, we must mean, unless we talk nonsensically, the whole of matter; and in our idea of the whole of matter, we must include all the properties which the varied compounds or parts of that *whole* possesses. Thus some compound bodies, such as sugar, have the property we call sweetness; *i. e.* their particles when applied to our organ of taste affect it in such a way as to produce in us the sensation of sweetness. Other compounds, such as gall and wormwood, have a different effect; and this must be owing to some difference in the nature of the operating substance. We usually say that compounds which produce in us the sensation of sweetness or bitterness, are sweet or bitter, meaning thereby that these compound bodies possess a power of exciting in us certain sensations which we call sweetness and bitterness. Now according to Mr. Brindley's argument, the ultimate atoms of all bodies must be alike; because "matter must be in its atoms what it is as a whole." But gall or wormwood are bitter, while sugar is sweet. Yet the ultimate atoms of both these bodies, *i. e.* the atoms of which they are composed, are what matter is as a whole; therefore they are both sweet and bitter, or they have the capacity, under given circumstances, to produce at the same moment of time in us the sensations of sweetness and bitterness, which is a plain contradiction and self-evident absurdity.

"Matter must be in its atoms what it is as a whole." Then it must have "in its atoms" all the properties which it has as a whole. But this is impossible. If we suppose the existence of ultimate atoms, we must suppose them indivisible, at least so far as practice is concerned. Now elasticity is one of the properties of a compound of atoms; and the elasticity of a compound body, is nothing more than the tendency which its atoms manifest under certain circumstances to keep at a distance from each other. There are also different degrees of elasticity manifested by different compounds; and all these different degrees of elasticity must belong to the ultimate atoms of matter, according to Mr. Brindley's argument,—I beg pardon,—I mean his assumption. Perhaps Mr. Brindley will be kind enough to afford us proof of this in the next edition of his "Reply," if ever it should reach a second edition.

If matter is in its atoms, what it is as a whole, then its ultimate atoms must have all the forms and properties which matter as a whole possesses. But the varied compounds which form parts of the whole have different properties; therefore all the ultimate atoms of matter must have all these properties. The varied compounds which form parts of the whole have also different forms; some are round, some are square, some are oblong, some rectangular; therefore the ultimate atoms of these compounds must be round, and square, and oblong, and rectangular, and all at the same time too, which is a plain contradiction and absurdity.

But not only is Mr. Brindley's assumption absurd and contradictory, but it is contrary to the facts with which chemical science has made us acquainted. Is it an extraordinary thing for two bodies to combine and produce a third, having properties entirely different to those which the two bodies possessed prior to their combination? Is it extraordinary for two bodies which are, when separate, comparatively inodorous, to produce by combination, a third body having power to affect our olfactory organs in a most powerful manner? Are not acids different from alkalies, and *vice versa*? Are not acids characterized by certain properties and alkalies the same? Does not the union of these bodies destroy the properties both of the acid and the alkali, and produce a third body, having properties entirely the reverse of those which belonged to the acid and the alkali prior to their combination? Now, here are a number of new properties which the acid body and the alkaline body possessed not in their separate state, and since the compound called an acid did not possess these properties, its ultimate atoms could not possess them, inasmuch as the "aggregation of atoms instead of destroying a principle would increase its intensity." Now, the ultimate atoms of the alkali, for the very same reason, did not possess these properties, and therefore, since the third body possesses them, it follows, that matter can acquire by combination properties which its atoms do not possess, considered separately, consequently "matter is not in its atoms what it is as a whole" as it regards size, shape, colour, and many other properties too numerous to mention. Mr. Brindley's argument therefore is absurd, because it is founded on an assumption directly opposed to the plainest deductions of chemical philosophy.

Let us further illustrate this argument by comparing the human structure with unorganized bodies. In the human frame we perceive a variety of elementary bodies, which in their ordinary state are dead, but in the human structure are alive. The science of chemistry teaches us that the softer parts of the human frame contain nearly the same elements as the oak, the pine, the lily, or the lichen. Do the ultimate atoms of the human structure possess respectively or individually (if the phrase be allowable) the same sort of properties which the compound as a whole possesses? We put the question in sober seriousness to any person acquainted with the elements of organic chemistry. We ask such a person if the particles of a bar of iron, or those of a bladder full of oxygen gas, possess the same characteristics as the thigh or leg of a man, or of any other organized animal? We ask them if hydrogen, carbon, azote, phosphoric acid, and all the other elements of the human frame exhibit the same appearance, or are characterized by the same sort of properties, when placed in phials on the shelves of a laboratory as when seen in the body of a living animal? Now how is it that these bodies acquire new properties, exhibit a new aspect, are fitted to accomplish a new

object when aggregated in the body of man? "These substances," to use the language of Sir J. C. Morgan, "are rarely, if ever, so entirely analogous to the substance of the species to which they afford nourishment, as to be adapted to immediate incorporation. They require certain intermediate processes, by which their actual combination is broken up, and their elements disposed according to another arrangement. In the simpler forms of organization, and especially in the vegetable kingdom, these processes are few; but in proportion as the elementary constitution is complex, they become numerous and varied; in man and the higher animals, they include digestion, sanguification, circulation, respiration, and nutrition."\*

Now the animal body consists essentially of four ultimate elements—oxygen, hydrogen, carbon and azote. This is correct as a general principle; but organic chemistry declares that some of the constituents afford scarcely any traces of azote. It has also been observed that two kinds of elements enter into the composition of the body—*chemical* and *organic*. The latter are composed and formed only under the principle of life.

The chemical or inorganic elements met with, are oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, azote, calcium, phosphorus, and, in smaller quantities, chlorine, sulphur, iron, manganese, silicium, sodium and magnesium. All these have been detected in the animal frame.

Oxygen is widely distributed through the solids and fluids; and a constant supply of it is indispensable to the support of animal life. Carbonic acid has been detected by Vogel in the blood. Hydrogen occurs universally in the animal kingdom. It is one of the constituents of all the fluids, and is generally found in combination with carbon. Azote is widely distributed as a component part of animal substances. Phosphorus is united with oxygen in the state of phosphoric acid in both the solids and fluids of the animal body. Phosphoric acid is combined with the earthy matter of bones, and with potassa, soda, ammonia, and magnesia in other parts. Calcium has been detected in the human frame as an oxide. Sulphur is also met with extensively in animal solids and fluids. Iron is found in the colouring matter of the blood, in bile, and in milk. Engelhart, a German chemist, succeeded in proving the existence of iron in the red globules of blood, both by liquid tests and by incineration. The experiments were repeated, and similar results obtained by Rose of Berlin. Iron in milk seems to be in the state of phosphate. Chlorine, in combination with hydrogen, and forming muriatic acid, is met with in most of the animal fluids. It is often united with soda, which being the oxide of sodium, is also found in all the fluids. Potassa is also found in the animal structure, united with the sulphuric, muriatic, and phosphoric acids. And magnesia, the oxide of magnesium, is also found in the animal structure.

Now we ask do the ultimate atoms of all these bodies possess the same properties which the compound possesses? If they do, they must have life and feeling, because the compound lives and feels; and if they do not possess life and feeling, then they cannot be what the compound is, as it respects these characteristics of the animal structure. How is it that iron as a phosphate in the milk of the mother, becomes living matter in the body of the child? Do the ultimate atoms of iron possess life before they enter the body of the infant? How is it that oxygen which we abstract from the air every time we respire, becomes part of our-living-selves? Are

\* Sketches of Phil. Life. p. 45.

the ultimate atoms of oxygen alive when they enter the body of man, or the bodies of other animals? But it is needless to pursue this subject any further, because every day, nay almost every hour we behold matter entering into new combinations and producing compounds having properties which none of the atoms of matter possessed separately; and therefore matter cannot be in its atoms what it is as a whole.

If we were convinced that Mr. Brindley had made himself acquainted with the various physical sciences, or even with the science of chemistry, we would feel disposed to pay attention to his remarks respecting the ultimate atoms of matter: but when we know that his acquaintance with chemistry is limited, if indeed he knows any thing about it, we can only view him in the light of an impertinent intruder, prating about things which he does not understand. What does he know about the ultimate atoms of matter? How can he tell that there are such things as ultimate atoms or not? When he speaks of *atoms*, he must mean either ultimate atoms essentially indivisible, or small compounds which, so far as actual experiment is concerned, are indivisible. If he means the first, then we say it is impossible for any one atom considered separately, to be the same as the whole of these atoms combined; and it is also impossible for any one atom to possess similar properties to the whole. If he means the second, then we say that small compounds differ essentially from each other, and therefore none of these bodies considered separately possess properties similar to those which the compound of the whole possesses. If he means that each of the atoms of matter considered separately possesses the same properties or similar properties to those which the whole possesses, we deny it, and found our denial on the foregoing reasoning; and if he means that the whole of these atoms combined possess the same properties which the material universe exhibits, then we say that his assumption is tautological and nonsensical; for it amounts to no more than this:—all the atoms of matter possess the same properties which the whole of matter possesses, i. e. the whole is equal to the whole, or the whole of matter possesses all the properties which the whole of matter possesses. There can be no doubt respecting the wisdom of this conclusion, nor can there be any doubt respecting the evidence it affords of the comprehensive sweep of John Brindley's intellect.

We have now to examine the other assumption on which Mr. Brindley's argument is founded, and then we shall at once attack his minor arguments in detail. The assumption we allude to is this,—“that the mere aggregation of particles instead of destroying a principle would increase its intensity.” This may be true in a particular sense, as it respects some of the general properties of matter; but not true as it respects some of those properties it acquires by combination. For example: if we suppose *gravity* to be a principle, we can increase this principle indefinitely by the constant addition of fresh particles, but then this increase of the principle of gravity is relative to the whole of the compound, and not to any particular atom of it; because we cannot make one atom more heavy by adding another atom to it. In the same way we may increase the size of a compound of atoms by the addition of fresh matter, but then we do not increase the size of the ultimate atoms of the compound we merely increase the size of the compound itself, because the whole must always be greater than any of its parts. Mr. Brindley's assumption therefore may be admitted in a particular sense, without benefitting his argument in the slightest degree. But in relation

to the particular properties which matter acquires by combination, Mr. Brindley's assumption is untrue. If we take a basin of water, and drop into it five drops of the strongest nitric acid, we shall find that the acid and the water will unite so as that the principle of acidity shall be imparted to the water. If now we drop five drops more of acid into the water, we shall find that the whole has become more acid, but the last five drops do not increase the acidity of the first five drops by being added to them. Take another and more homely illustration:—a pound of sugar added to another pound of sugar of the same kind, does not increase the sweetness of either the first or the last pound. The only effect producible by such an addition, would be an increase of relative power to the compound, on the principle that two pounds are greater in mass than one; and that therefore two pounds are capable of saturating a larger quantity of fluid than one; so that Mr. Brindley's assumption, or rather Dr. Dwight's assumption, is nothing but an assumption, unprovable, and at variance with the deductions of reason and philosophy.

If now we forsake the world of *inorganics* and enter on the wide field of illustration which sentient existences present to our view, we shall find more palpable proofs of the falsehood of Mr. Brindley's reasoning. Adopting Mr. Brindley's language for the sake of argument, we will say that there is such a thing as the principle of life. The oyster lives, the lion lives, man lives,—there is therefore such a thing as life, and this we shall call a principle.

Now the ultimate atoms of matter must possess life or they must not; i. e. they must be alive, or they must be dead. If they are dead, then do they acquire the property or principle of life by being united. It is obvious that the food we receive into our bodies becomes assimilated to our frames; and in the course of a very short time from being what we call dead matter, becomes part of our living selves. The fact cannot be denied, at least will not by any one who makes the smallest pretensions to a knowledge of physiology. If, then, the ultimate atoms of animal bodies are essentially dead, facts prove that these dead atoms can produce the principle of life without possessing the principle of life, when separate from each other. This then is directly contrary to his first assumption, namely, "that matter is in its atoms what it is as a whole." For here we see a number of atoms which are essentially dead, becoming alive—which state is the contrary of deadness.

If Mr. Brindley should say that the ultimate atoms of matter are alive, then we contend on his principle, namely, "the mere aggregation of particles instead of destroying a principle, would increase its intensity," that the more particles there are in an animal structure, the more intense the principle of life must be in that animal structure. Hence the principle of life is more intense in one man than another, and in one tribe of animals than another. Thus Daniel Lambert was a fellow all alive, while the Polish dwarf was not so much alive as the knight of the large waistcoat. And those giants that we read of in a certain book celebrated for the marvellousness of its stories, and the purity and extreme delicacy of some of its narrations, must have been more alive than the puling, pitiful, little fellow that wrote the reply to which we are replying. Again, the elephant must be more alive than the lion, the lion than the dog, the dog than the cat, the cat than the mouse, and the whale must be more alive than any of the preceding. But it is time to drop

the subject, for the absurdity of Brindley's reasoning must be evident to all.

Having despatched Mr. Brindley's assumptions, we now come to deal with his application of the principles assumed.

"Matter could not be either essentially eternal and intelligent, or essentially eternal and unintelligent, because it is not uniformly either one or the other."

What is meant by the phrases "essentially eternal and intelligent, and essentially eternal and unintelligent."? Did Mr. Brindley ever hear of any thing possessing eternity of duration, that was not essentially eternal? Why does Mr. Brindley use the words "essentially eternal," &c.? Does he mean by that phrase that there are some things of eternity of duration, that are not essentially eternal? But we apprehend he intended to say that matter could not be essentially intelligent, because it is not uniformly so.

Now what is meant by the word "essential" in this statement of the argument? It is necessary to define this before we proceed any further. If Mr. Brindley means to assert that matter is not essentially intelligent in the same way that it essentially possesses form, impenetrability, &c., we agree with him; but if he means to insinuate that intelligence can never become the property of a material compound we deny his inference, and demand his proofs. Matter as a whole may be (and we challenge any one to prove that it is not) eternal, and particular portions of it may be accidentally intelligent, which puts the doctrine before us in a new light. This will be objected to by the followers of Brindley, (if he has any such) and for the reason assigned by the redoubtable champion of orthodoxy himself. The reason is—

"It could not be essentially eternal and intelligent; for then are we constantly meeting with unintelligent compounds, as stones, earth, &c; resulting from intelligent atoms, which is absurd; for the mere aggregation of particles, so far from destroying a principle would increase its intensity."

Here then we see what Mr. Brindley means by the word *essential*, as applied to the assumed intelligence of material substance. If matter be essentially intelligent, according to him, it must be intelligent in its atoms; and if it were intelligent in its atoms, then the aggregation of these atoms would increase the amount of its intelligence. Thus we see that the whole of this reasoning so oft repeated, so much boasted of by the erudite and philosophical Mr. Brindley, rests upon the two assumptions we have refuted in the preceding pages. We do not say, however, that matter is essentially intelligent, we only say that matter organized in the body of man, is the substratum of intelligence; and that there is no proof of the doctrine which asserts the existence of an immaterial spirit, the substratum of intelligence in contradistinction to matter. But matter, mere matter, cannot be intelligent according to Mr. Brindley, because it is not uniformly so; then matter cannot essentially possess form, because it is not uniformly of any form; it is not uniformly round, nor uniformly square, nor uniformly triangular. Nor can it be essentially elastic, because its parts possess different degrees of elasticity; and therefore it cannot be essentially of any particular degree of elasticity; and as a consequence, the whole of these degrees of elasticity cannot be essential to it, and therefore it cannot be essentially elastic. Nor is matter essentially dead, nor essentially alive, according to this mode of reasoning, because it is not uniformly either one or the other. Thus our bodies have life, but the stones are dead; hence it follows that neither deadness nor life are essential to matter. In the same way, then, intelligence may not be essential to matter under one phase of combination, and yet be

essential to it when combined in a different way ; or in other words, intelligence is the product of a peculiar organization of material substance.

We are next informed by the sapient philosopher of March, that on supposition of matter being the subject of intelligence, we cannot suppose it to be essentially unintelligent ; “ for then ” observes he “ are we equally in a dilemma with respect to man himself, where intelligence is so plainly traced, and so universally admitted ; and we should be driven to the opposite absurdity of unintelligent atoms producing, by mere accumulation, an intelligent principle.”

This has been refuted in those paragraphs which shew that matter acquires by combination new properties.

The whole of this argument is brought forward to prove that matter cannot be the subject of intelligence ; and that as intelligence exists, it must be produced by something independent of matter. As Brindley observes :—

“ To what conclusion, then, are we inevitably driven ? Since it has been proved that some material compounds are endowed with intelligence, while others are altogether destitute of such a principle ; and since it has also been shown that matter in itself is neither intelligent nor unintelligent—are we not of necessity compelled to acknowledge that there must be in existence some great intelligent power that could give to matter or withhold from matter intelligence at his will,” &c.

Thus this boasted display of metaphysical reasoning resolves itself at last into the old argument, namely, “ intelligence must be of intelligence,” an argument which we will at once proceed to examine.

In discussing this subject, we cannot do better than quote the language of Antitheos, in reply to the same proposition, as advanced by Gillespie, the champion of the Philalethean Society, in Scotland. We quote his examination of the subject entire, because it embodies our own sentiments upon the subject, and because these sentiments are as well, if not better, expressed by Antitheos than we could express them ourselves. Mr. Gillespie’s argument, it will be perceived, is precisely the same as Mr. Brindley’s in spirit and purport ; the only difference between them being in that of style, language, &c. Mr. Gillespie’s argument is :—

“ Intelligence either began to be, or it never began to be. That it never began to be is evident in this : that if it began to be it must have had a cause ; for whatever begins to be must have a cause. *And the cause of intelligence must be of intelligence* ; for what is not of intelligence cannot make intelligence begin to be. Now intelligence being before intelligence begins to be, is a contradiction. And this absurdity following from the supposition that intelligence began to be, it is proved that intelligence never began to be.”

To this argument Antitheos replies :

“ The pith of this argument lies in the proposition, that, the cause of intelligence must be of intelligence. Now, I intend to show, that the principle here laid down is not to be depended upon, in which case the argument proves nothing ; and also, that admitting the soundness of the principle, it would lead to the introduction of an infinite series of intelligences, which would prove too much.

“ First, then, I would ask what intelligence is ? Is it a being—a substance—a thing that exists by itself ? Or, is it not, on the contrary, a characteristic property of a certain order of beings, dependent upon the exercise of their external senses, and by consequence their organization ? We cannot even conceive how it should exist independent of these circumstances. ‘ To have intelligence, it is necessary to have ideas ; to have ideas, it is necessary to have senses : and to have senses it is necessary to be material.’ Intelligence therefore, speaking generally, is nothing more than an accidental property of matter. It may be physically necessary to the being wherein it is found to exist,—yet, like organization, feeling, and life in the same bodies—may, like form, colour, &c., in vegetable substances, and even in many of those in the mineral world,—its production cannot be excluded from the class of effects resulting from material agency. This is strictly consistent with all facts—all observation ; and no doctrine of an opposite description, has ever been made consistent with either.

“ But is it a law in physics, that no new property can arise among substances in combination ?

That nothing can result from any combination, except what had previously existed in these substances?

"If this were the case, chemical science would be at an end; or rather, it never could have had a beginning; for its chief object, and greatest glory, is to discover new properties and powers in matter, and render these subservient to useful purposes. Let us, however, to use Lord Bacon's expressive language, 'put the question to nature.' Is combustion for instance, never produced in any case, but by substances previously in a state of combustion? The very common but interesting phenomenon of fire issuing from the collision of cold bodies, say flint and steel, is a sufficient reply. Another is, that oxygen and hydrogen, on being subjected to the agency of a sufficiently powerful heat, explode and resolve into water—a substance so hostile in its nature to the element from which in this case it sprung, that it is often employed to put down its fearful ravages. Multitude of examples of a similar description might be adduced, such as the ignition of iodine upon its contact with water; the exhibition of phosphoric light by agitating the brine of the ocean; the production of colour by means of mixing liquids, possessing none themselves; as well as the phenomenon of solidity resulting from a compound of substances in the fluid state: to enlarge would only be to occupy time in detailing what is too well known to require further notice.

"Intelligence," it may be said, 'is not a spark of fire; neither is it colour nor solidity.' True; but if the doctrine that would deduce the character of a cause from that of an effect be found incorrect in other instances, wherefore should it be correct in this? Moreover, to evince intelligence in an agent producing anything, it is not at all requisite that the same quality should be transferred to the thing produced. A steam engine, a ship, a house, a watch,—all are destitute of intelligence, yet clearly shew intelligence to have been engaged in their construction. If this property then exists in the cause, and not in the effect, why may it not exist in the effect without being in the cause?

"Throughout the whole range of our observation, indeed, there is not such a thing to be found as intelligence really producing intelligence. It discovers properties and powers in the various species of matter, it adapts these to its own purposes, and contrives new modes of applying them to those ends. In short, intelligence is not procreative: it does not generate anything of its own kind: its operations are entirely confined to the improvement of things and circumstances as found to exist, which may have a tendency to exhaust, but certainly not to produce it.

"Even in the generation of the human animal, what do we discover? Not the operation of intelligence adopting a specific procedure in order to compass an end; but what I have heard physiologists denominate a process of animal chemistry. Intelligence is not, and cannot be, present in the first stage of this process. Organization must, at least, be completed; and hence the quality in question is evidently the result of mere physical agency. If intelligence, or the power of being intelligent, be thus produced in one instance, nay, in many instances, as far as observation goes, why not in all.

"But original intelligence"—I think I hear it vehemently demanded,—'how came intelligence originally? By physical agency too?' In these questions and such like, now grown very common place, much is usually taken for granted, and not a little that it would be difficult to reconcile with philosophy. It is first assumed that, at some time or other, a pair of human beings, the progenitors of the order were brought into existence, and had the gift of intelligence bestowed upon them; and then, that all who do not agree to the truth of this theory, are obliged to satisfy the advocates of it with a solution of the occurrence assumed. In the mouth of the *Theist*, then, what are all queries of this sort but a begging of the whole question? What is it but to take for granted the existence of a supernatural being, capable of performing all the impossibilities ascribed to the God of the common faith? To analyze these points in their various bearings, would be to discuss the extensive and complicated doctrine of final causes, which would be prejudiced by any partial view of it that could be taken here. It will be sufficient to remark, that, supposing the existence of a God, vested with all power, and all wisdom, he must either be supposed to execute his works by mechanical means—such as are employed by the artist who models the clay with his own hands—or to have impressed upon matter such properties as would tend to the effectuation of his purposes by general laws. But the former supposition, besides being gross and degrading, and no where capable of support from anything like rational principle, is inadmissible on the ground that it indicates an estimate of the divine attributes infinitely beneath the standard specified. The question, therefore, to be settled is, (and be it always and most especially remembered, that every-thing at issue between the theist and anti-theist resolves itself into this question,) whether is it more consistent with science and philosophy, to imagine matter originally existing without properties, and then—making up for this deficiency—to introduce a being whose existence is only supposed for argument's sake, for the purpose of giving away what it has never been proved he had to give, namely, the properties of matter, to matter without properties; or to allow these properties to exist inherently, in that which we cannot exclude from our perceptions, which would be nothing—which would even be inconceivable without such properties.

"To ask any man which of the alternatives would be most consistent with reason, would be

offering an insult to that very reason. It may be very gratifying to people who have embraced a favourite theory respecting the origin of intelligence, to ask those who—although they could—do not choose to theorize upon subjects where experience alone is an adequate guide, how they account for the phenomenon in question; but the mass of absurdity into which these theorists have fallen, is too open and palpable not to serve as a warning against the foolish and empty pride of thinking to account for every thing, and particularly for a matter upon which all men are equally ignorant. It may be a humbling duty to acknowledge ignorance; but it is surely more philosophical to perform it ingenuously, than to vaunt of a species of knowledge which it is impossible for any one to possess.

"On the question of the origin of intelligence, then, the theologian stands upon much more untenable ground than his unbelieving opponent. The one, in the very last resource, would only be disposed to admit physical causes operating of themselves, and according to the nature of the substances operating; while the other insists upon nothing else than the same causes, only encumbered with an unnecessary and good-for-nothing superintendent. But even Mr. Gillespie's reasoning is totally unfit to establish his theory of eternal intelligence. For by a parity of reasoning, we may assert that matter exists; that it must either have existed always, or have been derived from something material; for that which is material must be of matter, and, consequently that matter is eternal. The last, indeed, is by far the best argument of the two, inasmuch as causation has a closer bearing upon things or substances, than upon mere properties. Take his reasoning in this case throughout, substituting matter for intelligence, and we have a powerful lever operating upon the fulcrum of his own principles for overturning all that he has brought against the self-existence of the material universe.

"But again, if the argument were admitted to be sound, that would deduce the existence of supernatural intelligence from the fact of human and perhaps other intelligences existing—say that of the dog, the elephant, &c.,—a thousand sequences would rush in with the admission in 'the most admired disorder,' reducing natural theology to a confused heap of contradictions and unmitigated folly. The form and organization of the elephant it might be alleged are eternal; because these are at present found to exist, and must therefore have had a cause. But that which bears the form and organization specified must come of an agent of the same structure; for no effect can result out of a cause of a different description. Hence the great first cause of all things would require, by the argument to be of all forms, all passions, all dispositions and characters, even the most contradictory and incompatible. I seek not to expose the nakedness of such a system, by distinct allusions to the baser as well as the more exalted, of the animal functions, and all the considerations that belong to them; yet I think it at least pardonable, to state a case strictly analogous to the author's own, but operating to the detriment of the divine character, that he may either see more clearly the fallaciousness of all such reasoning as that which he has employed in endeavouring to establish a supreme intelligence, or in the last resort, admit the conclusion, together with those just hinted at.

"Moral depravity exists: and moral depravity either began to be, or it never began to be. That it never began to be is evident in this, that if it began to be, it must have had a cause; for whatever begins to be, must have a cause. And the cause of moral depravity must be of moral depravity: for what is not of moral depravity, cannot make moral depravity begin to be. Now moral depravity being before moral depravity began to be, is a contradiction. And this absurdity following from the supposition that moral depravity began to be, it is proved that moral depravity never began to be: to wit, is of infinity of duration. And as moral depravity is of infinity of duration, and it supposes a being; and no succession of beings is of infinity of duration; it necessarily follows, that there is one being of infinity of duration which is of moral depravity."

"The objection therefore, to an ever-during intelligence, is fixed and settled upon the surest basis: but we have yet to take notice of what the author's argument would lead to, even although we were to grant the existence of super human intelligence, as necessary to account for the existence of that which is human. It may be stated in a very few words.

"In accounting for the existence of human intelligence, if it be necessary to look to a higher intelligence as the origin of it, we must account for the existence of the latter in precisely the same manner. We may turn the table of questions upon the Theist, and ask how this last has come into existence?—by supernatural causes too?—The conclusion is inevitable; and then the next? who gave intelligence to that? Something of course still higher in the order of intelligence, and still more remote in its agency. If we could stop even here there might be some little satisfaction resulting from the inquiry; but that is impossible. We can stop neither here nor any where else. The motive that acted in taking of the first step, urges to a second, a third, a fourth and a thousandth; and all, too, with undiminished force and energy. Once begin the series, and there can be no such thing as a termination to it. It would be a substratum of infinity of duration.

"Is there any sound reason, any rule in logic, to impugn the accuracy of this conclusion? Shall we be told that the intelligence to which we owe the little share of it we possess, is infinite, underived, and necessarily existing? Some proof of this were better than an assertion; for asser-

tion it certainly is, and that too, a gratuitous one. It is more ; it is a begging of the question at issue. How know we that the intelligence to which that of the human race is ascribed, is infinite ? By the character of its effects ? The imperfection of these, alas ! would justify us in coming to a very different determination. The weakness and waywardness of the human intellect, and the sad perversity of judgment with which the best are often afflicted, have become proverbial among the religious themselves ; and yet, from effects such as these, which they deplore so much, and complain of so loudly when it suits them to complain, these very people would have us to believe that the cause is absolutely infinite!\*\*\*

The foregoing masterly refutation of Gillispie's reasoning is everywhere applicable to the reasoning of John Brindley. In fact Brindley's reasoning is similar in spirit and purport to that of the Scottish *Philalethian*. We might enlarge on the reasoning of Antitheos; but any further expansion of the argument would be unnecessary. The reasoning of Antitheos is quiet sufficient to establish the objection to an ever-during intelligence on the strongest basis. We shall, therefore, sum up the pith of his arguments in a few short questions

First.—What is intelligence ? When we speak of intelligence do we not mean *the capacity to know* which man possesses, or *the amount of knowledge* which man acquires, or both ? Are not the capacity to know, and the amount of knowledge which belongs to man, things that have a relative existence, *i. e.* things which belong to man as qualities belong to their subject ? Do not both these things enlarge in proportion to the development of the brain, and the training to which the individual may be subjected ? Is the capacity to know produced, in the first instance, by physical or immaterial causes ? How can it be proved that it is produced by the latter ? If intelligence be considered as the synonym of knowledge, does not all true knowledge consist of truths deduced from carefully observed facts ? Is not human intelligence therefore perpetually augmenting ? How then can it be said with truth that intelligence is produced at once by the action of an immaterial agent ? Is not the production of intelligence connected with the production of the being that is intelligent ? Are not physical causes connected with the production of the being that is intelligent ? How then can it be proved that physical causes are not connected with the production of the capacity to know ? nay, more, that they do not exclusively produce it ?

Second.—If intelligence could produce matter, why may not matter produce intelligence ? If matter cannot produce intelligence, how can intelligence produce matter ? If matter cannot produce matter, how can intelligence produce intelligence ? If intelligence can produce intelligence, must it not divide the produced intelligence from itself, or create it out of nothing ? If intelligence is divisible must it not be composed of parts, and, if so, material ? Can we conceive of creation without conceiving of the application of force ? Can we conceive of the application of force, without conceiving the existence of something to which the force is applied ? But according to the doctrine of those who assert the absolute creation of intelligence, the thing did not exist before it was created ; therefore, force could not be applied to it ; therefore, there could be no act of a creating being ; and, therefore, there could be no absolute creation of intelligence. In the whole range of human experience can we point out a single action which does not involve the idea of the application of force to something in one way or another ? And if we cannot, what data have we to build the doctrine on, which asserts that any being can act without applying force, which involves the idea of the thing to which the force is applied ?

Third.—If intelligence can only be produced by intelligence, then sweetness

\* Refutation of Argum. *A Priori*, by Antitheos. p.p. 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77.

can only be produced by sweetness, bitterness by bitterness, elasticity by elasticity, matter by matter. Does not the acknowledgment of this principle in one case warrant its acknowledgment in all? And does it not lead to a degrading view of Deity?

Fourth.—If the proximate cause of any particular intelligence be physical, why may not the remote cause of the series have been physical too? If the proximate cause of any particular intelligence be a previously existing intelligence, must not the proximate causes of all the links in the series be previously existing intelligences? And, if so, by what principle of reasoning are we justified in affirming that the series is not infinite, and that therefore it must derive its origin from an underived self-existing intelligence?

Fifth.—Is it not sheer downright absurdity on the part of John Brindley to talk of God withholding intelligence from matter, or, imparting it to it at his will, when on his own principles it is not matter that is intelligent, but mind, a thing which in his opinion is a substance distinct from matter, immaterial and immortal?

When John Brindley affords us a satisfactory answer to all these questions, we shall then and not till then allow that he has not only rendered probable, but demonstrated, the existence of a conscious, intelligent, and personal Deity.

Mr. Brindley, after endeavouring to prove the existence of an intelligent God, then endeavours to prove that he must be a personal being as well as an intelligent being. We shall do the writer the justice to quote his argument in full.

At page nine he observes:—

“But it has to be proved that he is a PERSONAL as well as an Intelligent God.

“We cannot look upon a house, with its foundation, its walls of support, its rooms and offices, its stairs, doors, windows, cupboards, and other appointments, without being immediately convinced that it was intended to be occupied by man; that it was evidently *designed* to afford all the comfort and convenience of which it is capable. The house stands firm by reason of the foundation; the rooms continue in their shape because supported by the walls and woodwork; you ascend from floor to floor by means of the stairs; you enter the rooms by the doorway; light comes in through the windows, various articles of usefulness are stored in the cupboards, &c. &c. Now who will say that all these arrangements were not purposely contrived? Or who will say that by chance the walls happened to fix themselves upon a good foundation, and that, in the course of their erection, by chance those particular apertures were left that serve for doors, windows, and chimnies; and so of the other parts. The greatest sceptic in the world will readily admit, here, that the building was designed and contrived for the very use to which it is applied. He will even admit more than this. He will acknowledge, as acknowledge he must, that, whoever was the architect that first suggested the idea of such a building, he was a very clever, intelligent man; although he himself never saw the architect, or heard his name. He will allow, too, that in every instance where adaptation is exhibited, where certain definite results are secured by certain definite contrivances, that the designer and contriver possessed intelligence in proportion to the skill and completeness with which his work has been accomplished.

“Pursuing this argument yet further, consistently with the deductions of reason alone, every one must admit that, as design and contrivance predicate intelligence, so does intelligence predicate *consciousness*. For ideas of the most intelligent order would be perfectly valueless, unless the mind was conscious of their presence. And as intelligence predicates consciousness, so do intelligence and consciousness combined predicate a *personal* agent. You may defy all the philosophers in existence, with the whole band of sceptics and quibblers, to furnish one single instance of design and contrivance proceeding from anything short of intelligence; of intelligence existing apart from consciousness; and of intelligence and consciousness being found combined in any other than a personal agent.

“For the sake of example; suppose that a new and most beautifully constructed musical instrument were introduced to you for the first time, giving forth the sweetest sounds, and filling the soul with extacy and delight; and suppose that your curiosity prompted you to inquire into the nature of its construction, and the principles on which it was put together—would you not decide that the intelligence of the inventor and constructor was in proportion to the knowledge and skill exhibited in the production of the instrument? The more you yourself knew of the science of acoustics, (the laws that regulate sound,) and the more intimately you were acquainted with the

niceties of mechanical structure, the better would you be able to appreciate his merits, and the more earnestly would you exclaim, 'What an exceedingly clever man was the maker of this instrument!' You would never think of waiting to ask yourself the question, did the maker of this possess intelligence? Much less would you think of attributing its formation to mere *chance* or *accident*. Then, since the design and contrivance infer intelligence, the intelligence must infer consciousness, and these at once lead you to a personal agent. Now there is one musical instrument with which you are acquainted, that surpasses, in all the requisites of a musical instrument, every other that can be brought in competition with it. It is capable of infinitely greater variety in tone, compass, modulation, and distinctness of sound, than all the other musical instruments combined. To such an astonishing extent does this apply, that millions of these same little instruments, made of the same materials, upon precisely the same principles, can, in an instant, be distinguished from each other; and again hundreds can be sounded together so as to produce the most perfect harmony. Moreover, each one, separately, can utter sounds so strong and stirring, that a thousand hearts shall respond to the appeal, and feel prepared for mighty undertakings; and again, it can pour forth the sweetest and most plaintive strains that melt the soul to pity, and seem but the breathings of the zephyr. Then, when viewed in relation to its mechanical contrivances, it is found to possess a mechanism so delicate, so fragile, so complicated, so easily set wrong—yet with such an exquisiteness of adjustment, such skill of contrivance, such completeness of arrangement, that we are again struck with admiration at the adaptation and design in an instrument so small, yet so astonishingly perfect.

"It is the *larynx*, or *human voice box*, that in the last instance is referred to, and which forms the cartilaginous projection in the front part of the neck. It is so small, it may be held in the hollow of the hand. By means of the little glottis, or lip-like opening, it has all the properties of a wind instrument; and the delicate vibrating cords that are stretched across and within the larynx give to it also the properties of a stringed instrument. That it has all the variety of tone above referred to, is at once evident from the fact, that no two human voices are precisely the same. Here, then, comes the question, Who made the human voice box? That it was designed and contrived, no one can deny; yet is it equally plain man could not have fashioned it, because he must himself have first possessed a larynx ere he could have life to perform any operation. Then who did make the human larynx? The Socialist, denying revelation, will answer that neither he nor you can tell. Be it so. One thing, however, we can be quite sure of: that, as there is connected with it design and contrivance, the designer must have possessed intelligence, and therefore consciousness; and these faculties, we have seen, can only belong to a personal agent, whence we are led by fair deductions of reason to the personal intelligent being whom we call God; and thus has it been demonstrated by an appeal to reason and philosophy alone, that there must, of necessity, exist a personal and intelligent God; which was to be proved."

There are two points of considerable importance in this argument, to the consideration of which we will principally confine our attention. These are:—

First.—The proof of personality, as it regards the contriver of any piece of workmanship, afforded by the workmanship itself. And

Second.—The proof drawn from apparent marks of design, of the existence and attributes of the designer.

It is assumed by Mr. Brindley that design implies a designer; and that as the world exhibits marks of particular design it must have had a particular designer; and then it is further assumed that design implies intelligence, so that the designer of the world is, and must be, intelligent; and then, to crown the whole, it is assumed that because intelligence in this life is always connected with a personal being, so the Deity, being intelligent, must be a personal being.

Now if we are warranted to infer, from the fact of human intelligence being connected with personality, that divine intelligence is connected with personality, we are also warranted to infer from the fact of human intelligence being connected with a material structure, that divine intelligence is connected with a material structure; and the inference is as inevitable in the one instance as in the other. We have no proof that intelligence can exist apart from a material organized being; and even if the possibility of the thing were proved, that would not prove the actual existence of the phenomenon. We find in all instances that intelligence is connected with consciousness, and consciousness with personality; but we find at the same time that intelligence consciousness and person-

ality are invariably connected with a material body. If, then, Mr. Brindley can bring forward one instance wherein intelligence is unconnected with a material body; if he can shew us, in any way whatever, an intelligent being that is not a material being, then we will at once admit that he has some reason for supposing that the Deity is a personal, conscious, intelligent being, without, at the same time being a *material being*. We defy Mr. Brindley and all the natural theologians in the world, from the celebrated Paley, who "could not afford to keep a conscience," down to all the minor fry that follow in his wake, to produce a single intelligence that is unconnected with a material organization. If, then, in all cases known to us, intelligence is invariably connected with a material organization, by what principle of reasoning are we warranted to infer that it is in any case unconnected with a material organization. Because Mr. Brindley always finds human intelligence connected with personality, he infers that divine intelligence is connected with personality; and by the same principle of reasoning we are warranted to infer that because human intelligence is always connected with a material organization, therefore, divine intelligence is connected with a material organization. Mr. Brindley must therefore give up his argument or admit all the consequences which follow from it. He must either admit that the particular argument he has advanced does not prove the deity to be a personal being, or he must at once become an anthropomorphite.

With respect to the second point, or the proof from design for the existence of an infinite designer, we can only say that it is far from being satisfactory or conclusive; and its inconclusiveness has been admitted by theistical reasoners themselves. It is necessary, however, that we should state the argument fairly, in order that our remarks upon it may not be misunderstood.

The argument from design, or as it is commonly called the argument *a posteriori*, which is generally brought forward by natural theologians to prove the existence of a conscious, personal, intelligent God, is founded on the analogy subsisting between the works of art and the works of nature. As therefore the argument is of an analogical character, it must have all the defectiveness of an analogical argument connected with it. In reasoning from analogy, we have to take into account the number of points wherein the two things agree, and in proportion to the number and perfection of these resemblances, so is the strength of our inferences. Thus, if in all known points there is a perfect resemblance between the two things, we are warranted to infer that they spring from a similar source, and are under the influence of a similar law. For example: if the observations of practical astronomers render it evident that the planets Mercury, Venus, and Jupiter, move through space in a similar way to that in which the earth moves, we at once conclude that those bodies are influenced by the gravity of the sun as well as our earth. In this case we know something about the things compared; and therefore we may reason from the analogy subsisting between them. But in relation to the intelligence of the Deity, we know nothing independent of the analogy, real or apparent, subsisting between the works of nature and the works of art. All *a posteriori* reasoners are therefore obliged, in the conducting of their argument, to take for granted the very thing they ought to prove; for if they do not take it for granted that the phenomena they appeal to are not the products of laws essential to matter as an eternally existent thing, they surely cannot find any similarity between the manufacture of a machine, and the manufacture of a world, which would warrant the inferences they wish mankind to draw from the premises they assume. Without we assume that there was a time when a machine was made, we

certainly are not warranted to assume that it had a maker; and on the same principle, without we assume that there was a time when the world was made, we are not justified in inferring from the apparent marks of design in it, that it had a designer. This must be evident to every mind possessing the least acuteness, because if the world has existed from eternity, the marks of design which it exhibits must be of eternity of duration; and therefore no Supreme Intelligence could have existed before them so as to give them to the world in which they now appear. Thus, then, the theologian is obliged, before he proceeds one step in his argument, to beg the whole question by taking for granted the existence of the very being whose existence he undertakes to prove.

But farther; we know too little of the inherent properties of matter, to affirm dogmatically that they are the result of the operations of a Supreme Intelligence. The knowledge of even the most profound chemists and philosophers on this head is exceedingly limited, compared with the field which has yet to be explored; how much more limited then must be the knowledge of such men as John Brindley, Addison, and Doddridge of such a subject! And if the authority of all the great scientific men that the world has yet produced was ranged on the side of natural theology, that would not prove it true. No; its claims must be tested by facts and argument, and not by authority. To these then we shall appeal; not to the authority of great men.

And first we would ask what is design? Is it not the act of a designer? Can anything be design that is not the work of a being capable of designing? If, then, we assume the existence of design, must we not assume the existence of a designer? and if, prior to any reasoning on the subject, we are obliged to assume all that we undertake to prove, what arrant nonsense it is to talk of demonstrating that which we must take for granted, in order that we may effect its demonstration. Since we are obliged to assume it, why undertake to demonstrate it? What good end can be answered by reasoning after this manner.

The argument from design, so ably managed by Paley, is of an inductive character; and, as an inductive argument, can never assume the resistless force of a mathematical demonstration. We can demonstrate nothing, unless its converse involves a contradiction: and surely it cannot be said that the converse of the doctrines of Theism involve a contradiction. That such is the opinion of some of the religious themselves, will appear from the following extract which, being appropriate to our subject, we quote from the *Edinburgh Review*:—

“The primary question which the writer on Natural Religion has to solve is, *An sit Deus?* Is there a God? And there are two modes or forms in which a solution of this question may be offered: one, by reasoning from certain abstract principles assumed, and thus attempting, *a priori*, to demonstrate the necessary existence of such a being; and the other, by reasoning *a posteriori* from final causes, or the intelligent adaption of means to ends, discoverable in every part of nature or creation. According to the former mode, the existence of a God is necessarily involved in the very first principles or elements of knowledge, and therefore susceptible of being demonstrated without any reference to final causes, or external manifestations of intelligence and design. According to the latter, it is merely a deduction which experience enables us to make from certain arrangements in the economy of nature and providence, incompatible with any other supposition than that of their having proceeded from an intelligent and governing mind. The distinction, then, between these two methods of reasoning is obvious. If the existence of the Deity is proved to be necessary, the idea of his non-existence involves a contradiction; but if his being be only inferred from certain indications in his works, it in no respect differs from any ordinary matter of fact or belief, the reverse of which may be easily conceived, though it cannot be proved.

“Speculative writers, on Natural Religion, however, have of late years very generally abstained from attempting to make any use of the argument *a priori*. The truth is, it involves a radical fallacy which not only renders it useless, but dangerous to the cause it is intended to support.

The question as to the being of a God is purely a question of fact: he either exists or he does not exist. But there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by arguments *a priori*; because nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction; and this can never be predicated of the negative of any proposition which merely affirms or asserts a matter of fact. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also distinctly conceive as non-existent; and, consequently, there is no being whose non-existence implies a contradiction, or, in other words, whose existence is *a priori* demonstrable. This must be evident to every one who knows what demonstration really means. It is a universal law, that all heavy bodies descend to the earth in a line directed towards its centre. But the contrary of this may easily be conceived, because it involves no contradiction; for bodies might have fallen upward, if we may so express it, as well as downward, had such been the will of the creator. But we cannot conceive the opposite of any of the demonstrated truths of geometry—as, for example, that the three angles of a triangle should be greater or less than two right angles—because this implies a contradiction. The distinction therefore, between necessary or demonstrable truths or matters of fact, consists in this—that the contrary of the former involves a contradiction, whereas that of the latter does not. But there is no contradiction implied in conceiving the non-existence of the Deity; and therefore his existence is not a necessary truth *a priori* demonstrable.

“It is said, however, that if we knew the whole essence or nature of the Deity, we should perceive it to be as impossible for him not to exist as for twice two not to be equal to four. But, in the first place, we can never attain this knowledge, while our faculties remain in the same state as at present; and, secondly, even supposing that such an attainment were possible, it is difficult to imagine how any enlargement of our knowledge could affect the distinction which has just been pointed out, or incapacitate us for conceiving the non-existence of that which we formerly conceived as existing. Nor, indeed, does it seem possible that the mind, unless its essence and constitution be changed, can ever be subjected to the necessity of supposing any object always to remain in being, in the same way in which it is subjected to the necessity of conceiving twice two equal to four. ‘Any particle of matter,’ says Dr. Clarke, ‘may be conceived to be annihilated, and any form may be conceived to be altered. Such an annihilation or alteration, therefore, is not impossible.’ But he contends, though we do not distinctly perceive upon what grounds, that the reverse holds with respect to the Deity, whose non-existence, according to him, is inconceivable, and therefore impossible. The tendency of his own argument, however, is to lead to the opposite conclusion. For it extends to the Deity, so far as we have any conception of him, as well as to matter; it being not more difficult for the mind to imagine him non-existent or his attributes altered, than to conceive the non-existence of a particle of matter, or an alteration of any given form. It must be some unknown, inconceivable qualities alone, which can make his non-existence appear impossible, or his attributes unalterable.

“It seems obvious, then, that the celebrated argument *a priori* proceeds upon a confusion of two things, essentially distinct in their own nature; or rather, it attributes to one kind of truths the distinguishing characteristic of another: while, as Mr. Hume has shown, it is as available to the Spinozist, who maintains that the material universe is the only necessarily existent being, as to him who holds that necessary existence cannot be predicated except of a supreme governing mind or intelligence. Indeed, none of the metaphysical subtleties, which have been pressed into the service of Natural Religion, appear to have any other tendency than to darken the subject which they have been employed to elucidate. It is not by following such paths, and groping amidst such mystery and darkness, that the truths of Natural Religion are to be discovered. In the volume of nature, which is spread out before us for our instruction, there are written, in legible characters, which even he who runs may read, all those truths which the unenlightened reason of man can ever hope to discover, but which, in the pride of his understanding, he sometimes seeks to explore in a region where he is certain at last to lose his way.”\*

Thus this writer condemns the argument *a priori*, and advocates the argument from design. We shall now see what another champion of *Theism* says respecting the argument *a posteriori*, or that urged so ably by Paley, and so feebly by his disciple John Brindley. The author to whom we allude is William Gillespie, the author of a sophistical work on the existence of the Deity, &c., and one of the leading men belonging to the Philalethean Society of Scotland. This gentleman, in the work to which we allude, observes, in relation to the argument *a posteriori* that:—

First.—“It is attended with difficulties. But, though the *a posteriori* argument be good, so far as it goes, yet its discoveries reach only a little way. If we confine ourselves merely to its evidence, we shall inevitably find ourselves surrounded by many and serious difficulties which will oppress, if they do not discourage, the minds of the more inquisitive.

\* Vol. 52, October, 1830.—Art on Morehead’s Dial. on Nat. Rev. Religion.

Second.—“But before taking notice of the disadvantages attending this argument, if the aid of the other sort of reasoning is no wise introduced, let it be premised, that we are not, in any way, to enter upon the merits of that argument, but we shall take the validity of it, so far as its evidence reaches, entirely for granted: the object, here, being only to point out the defects it labours under, admitting its inference to be irresistible.

Third.—“*It assumes that the succession and order of things have not been eternal.* And since the validity of a *posteriori* reasoning, is to be taken for granted, we must also, assume the truth of those things which the very entering upon such reasoning plainly pre-supposes.

Fourth.—“We must assume, therefore, that the succession and order of all those things that the material universe contain, have not existed from all eternity. For be it remembered, that the *a posteriori* argument says, it discovers marks of a *particular* design in the phenomena of nature; and a particular design, surely implies the existence of a previously existing designer.

Fifth.—“Indeed, unless it be possible that the succession and order of things in the material universe may have had a designing cause, it cannot of course be ever shown that they had a designing cause. And it is not possible, one would think, that the succession and order of those things may have had a designing cause, if such order and succession have existed from all eternity.

Sixth.—“*The phenomena of nature cognizable by us, are finite in extent.* Not to insist that, because the *a posteriori* argument takes for granted, the nonentity of those phenomena of nature, which exhibit marks of design, these phenomena must be held to be only of finite extent. (A point beyond all question.) Nothing is plainer than that the marks of design which we can discover, must be finite in their extent.”

#### OF THE DISADVANTAGES ATTENDING THE ARGUMENT A POSTERIORI.

First.—“It cannot show that infinity belongs to God. One of the disadvantages, then, or rather a class of disadvantages,” (if these had been on the other side they would have been termed proofs of its fallacy and absurdity,) “attending mere a *posteriori* reasoning, is, that they can never make it appear that infinity belongs in any way to God.

Second.—“*It only entitles us to infer the existence of a being of finite extension.* The *a posteriori* argument can only entitle us to infer the existence of a being of finite extension: for by what rule known in philosophy, can we deduce, from the existence of an effect finite in extent, the existence of a cause of infinity of extension?

Third.—“The Deity cannot be every where present by mere energy. What becomes, then, of the omnipresence of the Deity, according to those who are content to rest satisfied with the reasonings from experience? Those who seek not the aid of the other species of reasoning, must let their system of Theism preserve a cautious silence upon so unaccountable a matter. It will be vain to talk of the Deity being present by his energy, although he may not be present by his substance, to the whole universe. For, 'tis natural to ask, not so much how it is proved, that God can be virtually present, though not substantially present, in every part of nature, as what can be meant by being every where present by mere energy?

Fourth.—“Add to this, that, even admitting the foolish distinction in question, a *posteriori* reasoning can no more make out, that the Deity is omnipresent by his virtue, than that he is omnipresent as to his substance. Admit the distinction, 'tis of no service.

Fifth.—“*This argument cannot prove the wisdom and power of God more than finite, nor that he is entirely free.* And from the inaptitude of the reasoning under consideration, to show that immensity or omnipresence belongs to God, it will be found to follow, directly and immediately, that his wisdom and power cannot be shown to be more than finite, and that he never can be proved to be a free agent.

Sixth.—“It is very plain, that omnipresence, (let it be only by energy,) is absolutely necessary in a being of infinity of wisdom. And, therefore, the *a posteriori* argument is unable to evince that the Deity is in possession of this attribute.

Seventh.—“It, likewise, plainly follows from the inaptitude of this argument to show that God is omnipresent, that, thereby, we cannot prove infinity of power to belong to him. For, if the argument cannot make out that the Being it discovers is every where present, how can it ever make out that he is every where powerful? By careful reflection, too, we may perceive, that omnipotence of another kind than power which can exert itself in all places, requires the existence of immensity.

Eighth.—“Without calling in the aid of subtle reasoning to prove, that if the argument *a posteriori* cannot show that God is omnipresent, it can never evince that he is a free agent; let those who may contend that by the reasonings from experience, it can be made to appear the

Deity is a free agent, be pleased to tell us what is that logical process by which they deduce, from the premises they have obtained, such a conclusion. Of what nature is the middle term, which puts beyond doubt the agreement of subject and predicate in the proposition, that the God whom the argument from experience doth reveal is entirely free?

Ninth.—“*If we cannot show the Deity is of infinity in a certain respect, we cannot show he is of infinity in any.* But, indeed, without having been at pains to show, that if we cannot prove the immensity or omnipresence of the Deity, we can, for that reason never show that he is omniscient—that he is omnipotent—that he is entirely free. It had been sufficient simply to say that if the Deity cannot be proved to be of infinity in any given respect, it would be nothing less than absurd to suppose that he could be proved to be of infinity in any other respect.

Tenth.—“*This argument cannot make out that God was from eternity.* Not to lay any weight on the truth just announced, that if we cannot prove God to have a particular infinite attribute, we can never show that infinity of any kind belongs to him: or, not here to insist on this point, that we shall never be able to make out that there is an eternal being, if we be not able to make out that there is an immense being; the eternity of a being as much implying his immensity, as his immensity would evidently infer his eternity, the *a posteriori* argument can do no more than prove, that at the commencement of the phenomena which pass under its review there existed a cause exactly sufficient to make the effect begin to be. That this cause existed from eternity the reasonings from experience can, by no means, show. Nay, for ought they make known, the designer himself may not have existed long before those marks of design which betoken his workmanship.

Eleventh.—“And because reasoning of the kind in question cannot prove, that the God whom it reveals has existed from all eternity, therefore, for any thing it intimates, God may, at some time, cease to be; and the workmanship may have an existence when the workman hath fallen into annihilation. For of that being only who never had a beginning the non-existence implies a contradiction.

Twelfth.—“Conceiving the topics alluded to, the argument leaves us quite at a loss. It gives some little information, and then is found inadequate to extend our knowledge the least way farther.

Thirteenth.—“Neither can this argument prove that God is infinitely good, wise, and just. It would be worse than useless to expend many words in showing that the argument *a posteriori* cannot prove that God is of infinite goodness, and justice, and all other infinite moral perfections. Without insisting that there must be infinite natural attributes as a foundation whereon to build infinite moral attributes, (a thing certain,) 'tis evident that the same reason that prevents us from proving the first, will for ever prevent us from proving the second.

Fourteenth.—“Reasonings from experience cannot prove the unity of God. . . . How can such reasonings ever assure us of the unity of the Deity? It will be granted that the question as to the unity of God, involves a point of much importance: the point perhaps of greatest moment connected with our speculation as to his existence. But, whether there be but one God or not, the argument from experience doth by no means make clear. It discovers marks of design in the phenomena of nature, and infers the existence of at least one intelligent substance sufficient to produce them. Farther, however, it advances not our knowledge: whether the cause of the phenomena be one God or many Gods, it pretends not to determine past all doubt.

Fifteenth.—“The contrivances we observe in nature, may establish a unity of counsel: how can they establish a unity of substance.

Sixteenth.—“In the phenomena that surround me I see certain means adapted to certain ends. Without hesitation I conclude there was a designer. But did this designer create the matter in which the design appears? Of this, the argument *a posteriori* cannot convince us. For that argument does no more than infer a designing cause from certain appearances; in the same way as we would infer from finding some well contrived machine in a desert, that a human being had left it there. But point out marks of design, certain means adapted to certain ends, in gross untractable matter itself?

Seventeenth.—“Now because this reasoning cannot convince us of such a creation, it cannot convince us that there is not a plurality of Deities, or of the causes of things. As thus: If the designer whom this argument discovers did not create the matter containing the design, but that was created by some superior agent, then here is a complete destruction of the unity of God. If matter was not created at all, then we are involved in the supposition of that strange plurality of Gods, in which there is, at least, one physical substance, and that may be the more ancient member of the Ditheism.

Eighteenth.—“But even though we hold that the designing cause of the phenomena we see, created the matter in which they appear, (an opinion for which the argument in question gives

no evidence,) what the nearer are we to a real proof of the unity of God? Did he who created and fashioned an inconsiderable part of the universe, create and fashion human nature? Perhaps he did not. Then we have no proper evidence for the doctrine of his unity.

Nineteenth.—Besides, to insist on no other topic, if we cannot prove the eternity of God, it is not possible that we can prove the unity of God. To say that for any thing we know to the contrary he may not have existed from all eternity, being much the same thing as saying, that for any thing we know to the contrary, there may be another God, or many Gods besides.”\*

Bravo, Mr. Gillespie! whatever your faults as an *a priori* reasoner may be, you certainly display in the preceding passages, the strong good sense and logical acuteness for which you countrymen are proverbial. Yet your colleague in the glorious work of uprooting Socialism; your dear brother in Christ; with not half the amount of information, common sense and acuteness which you possess, has undertaken to demonstrate *that* which you declare to be demonstrably impossible! Whether are we to believe the principal opponent of Socialism in Scotland, or the principal opponent of Socialism in England, in this matter? William Gillespie declares that the *a posteriori* method of proving the existence of God labours under disadvantages, which of course implies that it is not demonstrative in the proper acceptation of the term—*demonstration*. John Brindley, on the contrary, affirms that by this mode, we can demonstrate the existence and attributes of an intelligent, conscious, personal Deity; and not only affirms that this can be done, but pledges himself to the public to do it. Whether he has succeeded or not, let the readers of this treatise say.

Can there be any truth or certainty in the dogmas of theology? If there be, why do men in reasoning on its fundamental principles differ so widely from each other? Few men doubt their own existence; and theologians occasionally affirm that the existence of a personal, conscious, intelligent ruler is as palpable to reason as is our own existence to our inward consciousness. Yet, notwithstanding the mighty array of apparent proof which the theologian affirms he can bring forward in support of the fundamental dogma of all mystical religionism, men are inclined to doubt the validity of those reasonings which others advance on the subject. Thus the Edinburgh reviewer asserts the argument *a priori*, to be untenable, “involving a radical fallacy, which renders it dangerous to the cause it is brought forward to support.” The author of the “Necessary Existence of the Deity” declares it to be tenable, highly advantageous to theology, and the only mode of argument by which the necessary existence of the Deity can be demonstrated. When the advocates of theism are thus at variance among themselves, how can they expect those who are sceptically inclined to subscribe to their opinions?

The reasoner of the *a posteriori* school points to the beauty, order and apparent contrivance exhibited in the material universe, and then triumphantly asks, can such things be without an intelligent designer? In questions of this kind, much is taken for granted that ought to be proved. It is first assumed that there was a time when matter did not exist; and then it is assumed that matter had a creator; and then we are informed that the existence of plants, trees, flowers, herbs, insects, animals and all the endlessly diversified combinations of material substance affords demonstrative proof of the existence of a personal, conscious, intelligent Deity. But in strictness and propriety of reasoning it ought to be proved in the first place, that material substance had a beginning, or that there was a time when material substance did not possess the properties which it at present possesses, before we are warranted to infer, from the fact of

\* An Argument *a priori* for the Being &c., of a God, by Wm. Gillespie. p.p. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11. 8vo. Edinburgh, 1833.

its existence, that it had a creator; or from the relation which one portion of substance stands in to another, that *that* creator is intelligent. Yet the theologian, without being able to advance one valid argument against the eternity of matter, assumes, or takes for granted, that there was a time when matter did not exist; and that therefore there must be an intelligent Deity in existence who produced it, and gave it those properties which it now possesses.

Man, perceiving that each new combination of the elements of matter has had a beginning, is led to infer that the whole must have had a beginning; and we apprehend that it is the consciousness of this truth, that the combinations of matter begin to be, which renders it so difficult for some minds to dissociate the idea of commencement from the idea of the universe. They perceive that men and other compound bodies begin to be; and therefore they immediately infer that there was a time when the universe began to be. Such a conclusion, however, is not logically deducible from the premises, nor is it warranted by an appeal to facts. The only thing in relation to matter which can be said to have a beginning, is the particular mode of its combination. The matter itself exists under other forms, and in other combinations, before it becomes combined in the body we may be considering. Thus, there was a time when the writer of this treatise did not exist as an organized being, but who would be so unphilosophical as to affirm that the matter which now forms his frame, did not exist previous to the time it entered into his system and became part of his *living-self*. The same thing may be predicated of plants, trees, vegetables, and all other organic or inorganic compounds. The elements which enter into their composition existed previous to their actual combination in particular compounds. The only thing, then, with respect to the elements of matter, which can be said to have a beginning, is the mode of their existence in any compound body that may be the subject of our cogitations. There is no proof, therefore, that there ever was a time when matter did not exist; nor is there any valid proof that there ever was a time when matter, *as a whole*, did not possess all the properties which characterize it at present.

Yet all reasoners of the *a posteriori* school invariably assume the nonentity of matter. How, they ask, can the order and beauty observable in the physical universe, the vicissitudes of the seasons, the alternation of day and night, the balance of contrary physical powers, the mechanism of the human structure, and all the other phenomena of nature, be accounted for, unless we suppose the existence of an intelligent designing God, who causes these phenomena to come into being by his energy and power? But, we would ask, does this afford proof of the fundamental dogma of all mystical theology? Does our ignorance of the causes of things—our non-acquaintance with the energies of nature—render a theory true, which men may invent to account for the phenomena in question? No: the truth of such a theory must be proved by another mode of reasoning than that generally adopted by theologians.

We may now triumphantly ask, has Mr. Brindley fulfilled his promise? has he redeemed the pledge he gave to the public when he wrote and published his "Reply"? He undertook to *demonstrate* the existence of God; and yet, strange to say, his attempt at demonstration is a pitiable piece of sophistry, which, at best, amounts to no more than a strong probability, but by no means assumes the force of a mathematical demonstration. Yet this man charges Robert Owen with Atheism simply because the definition which Robert Owen gives of the Supreme Power of the universe is at variance with the definition which Mr. Brindley, in the plenitude of his sagacity, thinks proper to give

of the same power! Yet, notwithstanding all the boasting and rhodomontade of the pure and noble-minded philosopher of March, he has not advanced one solid argument to prove that the Supreme Power of the universe is a personal being, which must be done before he is warranted in charging any man with Atheism who happens to entertain an opinion different to that entertained by Mr. Brindley on the subject. The only argument (if it deserves the name) which Mr. Brindley offers to his readers in proof of his position is this; that we never find intelligence, except in conjunction with personality; and as the Deity is intelligent, so the Deity must be a personal being. Now we would simply ask those who subscribe to this opinion, or who admit the validity of this reasoning, to ponder on the following questions:—

First.—Suppose the Supreme Power of nature to be a universal mind, does it follow, or is it reasonable to suppose, that such a mighty intelligence is similar to the puny mind of man?

Second.—Does it follow, therefore, that because human intelligence is always connected with personality, that divine intelligence must exist in the same way?

Third.—If the fact that human intelligence is always connected with personality, warrants us to infer that divine intelligence is connected with personality, does not the fact that human intelligence is always connected with an organic structure warrant us to infer that divine intelligence is connected with an organic structure? And does not this lead to, or rather is it not, Anthropomorphism?

Here, then, we may observe that if the principles of Robert Owen lead to Atheism, the principles of John Brindley lead to Anthropomorphism! And if abusive epithets are to be considered as arguments, we will admit that the Socialists are Atheists; but at the same time we contend that those who call them so, are Anthropomorphites!

We have now brought our strictures on Brindley's book almost to a conclusion. Before, however, we take leave of our honest friend, we deem it in some measure necessary to apologize to our readers for troubling them at all with remarks on the writings of John Brindley. Many persons we know are disposed, to consider the present treatise unnecessary and uncalled for, inasmuch as John Brindley is not a person of any considerable worth, nor are his writings of any great importance. We heartily subscribe to this opinion. We desire, however, to inform such persons, that it was not because the "*Reply*" was written by John Brindley, but because it contained some of the most popular arguments on the subjects to which it refers, that induced us to unmask its sophistry. The arguments advanced by Brindley, respecting the immortality of the soul and the existence of the Deity, are to be found in innumerable works; not only in the writings of Butler and Paley, but in the numerous literary abortions of all the minor fry of theological pamphleteers which periodically and annually issue from the press. The fact that the arguments contained in John Brindley's book are urged with the utmost degree of pertinacity by all grades of religionists, is the principal reason why we have taken such pains to refute them.

With respect to the remainder of Mr. Brindley's reasonings on Christianity, its divine origin, its miracles and its prophecies, we need only remark that they are all borrowed from other writers. Mr. Brindley, unable to advance anything original on the subject, copies Keith and Leslie with the utmost degree of servility. So far does Mr. Brindley carry his servility in this respect, that in quoting Keith he literally quotes his mistakes. Keith refers his readers to a chapter and verse in Daniel, when he ought to have referred them to one in Haggai; and

Mr. Brindley, who evidently knows but little about the contents of that Bible of which he prates so much, literally copies the mistake! We mention this circumstance as a thing of no great importance in itself, but as indicating the abject servility with which Mr. Brindley copies his masters. It would be very easy indeed to refute his arguments drawn from supposed prophecies and imaginary miracles; but as the arguments advanced by Mr. Brindley are those advanced by Keith, Leslie, and others, and as we purpose writing separate treatises in reply to those writers, we do not wish to anticipate any observations we may then have to make on the subject.

In conclusion we would desire the readers of this work to bear in mind that whatever may be our private opinion on religion or other subjects, we feel desirous of cultivating a spirit of charity and kindness to all: We owe no man a grudge because he differs from us on speculative points. We desire to do good to all without regard to their sect, their country or their colour. Would that this charitable feeling were universal! Then the *odium theologicum* would be destroyed; men would agree to differ; and a dignified warm-heartedness would usurp the throne of the human heart, which has so long been the seat of selfishness and hatred.

## MISCELLANEOUS

# REFLECTIONS ON RELIGION.

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As we have brought our strictures on Mr. Brindley's book to a conclusion, and as they have not filled the space we originally intended them to occupy, a few detached remarks on religion may not be unacceptable to the reader.

There is no ordinary task more difficult, perhaps, than that of explaining the source of those feelings which have generally been termed religious. We do not mean those feelings of kindness and philanthropy which form the brightest gems in humanity's coronet, but those feelings of awe and devotion which relate to the mysterious, and spring out of a supposed relationship with the unknown. It is evident that such feelings have been exhibited by men of cultivated intellect, as well as by men little elevated above a state of barbarism. It is equally evident that such feelings have exercised a marked influence over the conduct and character of mankind. These are facts which no person acquainted with human annals will deny. It remains therefore to be decided whether those feelings are essential to the nature of man; whether the feelings usually denominated devotional, are elements in our moral being, which cannot be separated from it; or whether they are passions indigenous to the human bosom, accidentally directed towards particular objects, and operating under the influence of that direction in a certain way; but at the same time capable of receiving a different, a more beneficial, or a more pernicious direction.

Religion has frequently been made to lend its apparent sanction to the worst deeds that a debased humanity could commit. In the hands of governments, it has been used to fling a decent veil over the physical oppression of man. The Spaniards when they desolated Hispaniola and the other Islands of the West, when they enslaved the inhabitants and cruelly compelled them to work in the mines, did so under the pretext of reclaiming them from idolatry, and instructing them in the principles of the Christian faith. In the hands of the sacerdotal tribe, religion has been made an instrument for the moral debasement of mankind. "How many nations have bent the knee to priestly artifice, and sacerdotal pride? Sycophants of all kinds, and hypocrites of all forms, have been her train-bearers and menials in all the regions of the globe. Every country under heaven has, by turns, been made a scene of misery by the iron violence of the despot, or the insidious subtlety of the priest. Nor has the wretchedness produced ever been greater than where sceptred power has been assisted in its pillage, and defended in its atrocities by mitred craft. The profession of superior sanctity has been employed to abet the most mischievous purposes of secular domination; and all sorts of impositions have been practised, and all sorts of enormities perpetrated under the pretence that they had the sanction of the Deity."\*

\* Fellowes' Religion of the Universe. p. 136.

In proof of the preceding statements, we appeal to history. Look at Europe—peruse her annals—and then determine whether our assertions are true or false. Behold the dark vaults of the Inquisition, the manacles, the screws, the dry pan and gradual fire, the rack, and other instruments of torture which were formerly conspicuous parts of the machinery of that infernal institution; and then say whether religion has or has not been made an instrument of cruelty in the hands of superstitious man. Look at the slaughter of St. Bartholomew; look at the persecution of the Catholics in the days of Elizabeth, the “good Queen Bess” of *inglorious memory*; look at the burning of Michael Servetus; look at the test act; look at the strife, bickerings and spirit of animosity which characterize almost all grades of professing Christians at the present day, and which have characterized them throughout all past time; and then decide whether the good religion has conferred on man balances the evils it has produced, and the enormities to which it has given birth.

We are aware that the advocates of religion are prone to say that the before-mentioned atrocities are not fairly chargeable on religion; that they result from the depravity of the human heart; and that they ought rather to be considered as striking proofs of the veracity of holy writ, than as evidences of its falsehood and of the pernicious influence of religion on mankind. This appears to us, however, a pitiful and lame defence of religion. Religion does not exist in a book; it exists in man. There is no principle contained in the Bible, or in any other book. The Bible and all other books are but fragments of paper marked with ink. The characters drawn on paper when perceived by the eye, generate principles in the mind. These principles constitute knowledge. The principles drawn from the Bible, or rather produced by a perusal of the Bible in the human animal give birth to feelings and to actions, the sum of which constitutes religion. These feelings, and the consequent trains of action they have prompted, have been in too many instances debasing to the intellect of man, and horrific in their consequences. They have transformed the beautiful fields of earth into a charnel house, and bathed them in blood and tears.

What is a certain book but a history of war, corruption, and bloodshed? Can any good result from the detail of exploits, from the perusal of which the humane mind must turn with disgust. Could any person in the present age imitate the deeds of Joshua, Moses, David, or Samuel, without exposing himself to universal execration? Yet the book which describes such actions, and which holds up their perpetrators to public view as the favourites of heaven, is held to be the depository of a pure divine and beneficent religion! O! poor outraged and insulted humanity! thou hast been sadly abused and trampled upon by error, ignorance, and superstition!

When a religious man commits a crime or acts dishonourably, the religious world say that he is not religious—that he is merely a nominal professor—that religion never affected his heart, and that therefore his conduct reflects no disgrace on the principles of religion. We grant them all the force which they claim for this argument, provided they can prove that his religious principles did not prompt the actions he may have committed. But will they allow their opponents the same privilege? Will they concede to them the same right? If, for example, a follower of Paine or Voltaire should commit a crime, will they allow the advocates of infidelity to plead that it resulted from other causes than the speculative principles which such

an individual had embraced? O no; that would be too much to concede to an opponent. In such a case the religious periodicals would be filled with fierce denunciations of infidelity; the religious tract society would issue tracts purporting to trace the infidel's crime to the infidel's principles, and many a time the pulpit would resound with the narration of his misdeeds. Why then is this to be allowed in the one case and not in the other. Surely there is a lack of justice in this.

From the dogmatism of sectarianism we turn with pleasure to contemplate the following picture of Religion drawn by the graphic pen of Dr. Robert Fellowes.

"The religion which is calculated to excite the devotional feelings of all intellectual beings, and which is alone worthy of their acceptance as a true and resplendent mirror of the divine agency in all its diversified manifestations, must be taken from the book of the universe. This book is composed of pages as solid as the rocks, and as bright as the stars. It is a volume of infinite magnitude, consisting of earths and oceans, of planets and suns, of clusters of stars, and of nebulae, including millions of systems. It is a book which all may read, and which all may profit by reading; but of which we could never know the whole contents, nor come to the last chapter, though it should be read for ever and ever.

"The religious sentiments of all ranks and conditions must be exalted by being taught, that though our earth and moon, with the other planets and the central sun, constitute one system; yet that this system, vast as it seems, and vast as it really is, compared with our finite notions, is only one of myriads, or rather millions of systems of similar or greater extent. What does the Book that Bishops and Archbishops, and Deans and Canons, and all the holders of rich benefices, vaunt as telling us all that we can know of God, tell us of this? And yet, this is what God bids us know, and tells us not to rest without knowing; or why did he give us an idea of the infinite and make it an object of desire?

"The salutary influence, which the perpetual inculcation of these truths would have upon the mind and heart, would soon be found superior to that which any dogmatisms of the old superstitions have ever produced. A new, more moral, orderly, and enlightened race of beings, would, in the course of a few years, be seen upon the earth. The belief of the marvellous would gradually cease; but a belief of a more rational kind would soon rise up in its place. The firm conviction of the universal presence of the Deity, and of his perpetual agency, showing itself in successive manifestations, according to the intellectual expansion and mental growth of the human race, would supersede the imaginary necessity, and consequently banish the belief, of supernatural interpositions.

"If the divine presence were ever withdrawn from any portion of the universe, must not a chaotic confusion ensue? All things, all worlds and systems, scattered through infinite space, rest upon that support. They can have no other. For what but the infinite and the eternal can maintain the limited in space and the circumscribed in time? Where the divine agency is always present and operative, it necessarily excludes the necessity of marvellous interpositions. Such interpositions could only be required to correct some error or remove some defect; but where there is a never ceasing presence and unintermitted agency of the infinite and eternal, is it not impiety to suppose the possibility of error or defect? Is it not absurd

to adopt the hypothesis of marvellous interventions or extraordinary revelations?

"The divine mind is continually revealing itself to the finite in all the varied phenomena of the existing universe. The more these phenomena are the subjects of observation and the objects of reason, the more will the consciousness of the divine presence be impressed; and the more the evidence of the never-ceasing divine agency be increased. A belief in miracles always supposes an unstable and vacillating belief in the perfections of the Deity. It is a credulity originating either in scanty knowledge or in blind ignorance. The Religion of the universe teaches better things.

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"Whenever the clergy shall cease to be dogmatists, and cease to inculcate a belief of mystic creeds and marvellous legends, and shall adopt the great truth, that religion consists in knowing God, and that God can be known only in his works, the doctrines which the best interests of humanity would then require them to teach, would popularize the most important truths, and bring the most useful portions of all the sciences within the sphere of common understandings.

"Every week would then make some addition to the knowledge of the people. Their intellectual advancement would be unceasing. The church would then be truly a watchtower of light. Darkness, in the mantle of religion would no more cover the land. The spectres of superstition would gradually vanish before the light of a better day. Mental light would produce, or tend to produce, moral purity. Morality, instead of being taught as a question of authority, or inculcated as a mass of positive dogmatisms would be put on its true footing,—the general good of society and the particular good of the individual!"\*

To a religion of this sort we would not offer one word of opposition. If the priests would inculcate the great truths which the sciences reveal, we would not only listen to them but lend our feeble aid to render their ministry effective. If they would but forsake the antiquated errors of a mystic theology, and become the instructors of the people, we would not raise our voice against them. If they would allow others to differ from them in opinion without evincing so much uncharitableness and ill feeling towards them; if they would cease to hurl, in anticipation, millions of their fellow beings to perdition for no other reason than non-belief in abstract doctrines; if they would clothe themselves with the mantle of charity and dispense real knowledge to their flocks, then would we cease our opposition to the priestly order, and become its firmest supporters. But so long as we behold them marshalling their hosts for the purpose of enslaving the minds of the people; so long as we perceive the manifestations of uncharitableness; the hostility to all social and national reform; the clinging to antiquated superstitions; the spirit of animosity; the grasping after wealth, and place, and power, which at present characterize the priesthood, so long shall we do all in our power to abate their pride, instruct the people, and deliver them from the iron fetters which have been thrown around them.

It is said of the great D'. Alembert, that he was extremely tolerant in his opinions, and charitable towards those who differed from him on speculative points. This is the spirit of kindness we desire to cultivate. Even towards

\* Religion of the Universe p. 61. et seq.

the priesthood would we cherish these feelings. But though we respect them as men—though we look upon them with a fraternal feeling as partakers of a common humanity, we owe no respect to their errors; and it is pretty evident that their conduct, with few exceptions, deserves none.

True religion, the religion that is imperishable in its nature and beneficial in its consequences, is universal love based on knowledge. False religion is a blind submission of the mind, a prostration of all that is great and noble in humanity, to arbitrary authority and incomprehensible dogmas. The former we embrace; the latter we despise and reject. The religion of blind faith has been taught for ages, and the hard earnings of the poor have been wrung from them to support its ministers. Kingly power has engaged in its defence, statesmen have lent it their countenance, and the populace have embraced it. What good has it done for the people? Has it banished the thick clouds of ignorance which cover our land, or controlled the insatiable thirst for gain which leads the master and capitalist to oppress the workman? Has it denounced competition, or cheered with social comforts the cottage fireside? Has it instituted a wise system of education, destroyed the allurements to vicious indulgence, or neutralised their influence by the more powerful motives it furnishes to virtue? Experience answers—No! Society, with its hundred tongues, answers—No! No! It may have done some casual good; it may have powerfully affected some minds, and led them to change their conduct; it may have cheered a few with enthusiastic visions of a blissful futurity; but with respect to the general prevention of crime, the general bestowment of knowledge, and the general cultivation of morality, it has been utterly powerless.

Look at the system of prostitution in the metropolis; look at the physical destitution of our factory labourers; look at the number of our jails filled with criminals; look at the bickerings of sectarians, for an answer to this question! Has the religion of blind faith benefitted man? O! the response is in the negative! The crimes of felons; the existence of police; of armies; and all the machinery of war; of courts of justice, and their interminable chicanery, declare that the religion of blind faith is utterly unable to regenerate society.

If the inculcation of incomprehensible dogmas were a sufficient instrument to renovate the moral world, and establish the reign of righteousness and peace, society ought to wear a different aspect than that it now exhibits. Eighteen centuries is a pretty considerable length of time to test the practical value of a religion, especially of a religion which purports to have "God for its author, truth for its foundation, and heaven for its end." Yet for the last eighteen centuries has the religion of blind faith been tested; and though it may have effected much good, this good has not been commensurate with the wants of the people, nor has it been sufficient to balance the evil which has sprung out of the working of the very machinery that produced it.

But divines will tell us that evil springs not from religion, but from the depraved heart of man. We admit the truth of the allegation, and immediately urge the question—Can religion be of service to that heart which it is unable to reclaim? Can the blind faith in mysterious dogmas be sufficient to change the moral landscape and cause paradise to bloom, when it is unable to prevent the mischiefs of that very depravity for the destruction of which it was invented or revealed?

"O! but," says the priest "in course of time the gospel will be preached to every son of man, and then men shall know the Lord, and the regenera-

tion of the moral world be effected!" But the religion of blind faith has been preached for eighteen centuries, and the moral world is not yet regenerated! and eighteen centuries more may elapse before such a phenomenon occurs! Eighteen centuries is too long to wait; we will try another plan to renovate society.

Can it be expected that the mere belief in this or that particular dogma, or that the apprehension of remote punishment will prove sufficient to prevent the commission of crime when placed in opposition to the more immediate and more pressing temptations which old society unhappily furnishes in abundance? In order that the apprehension of remote punishment may operate to prevent men from committing crime, it is necessary that their minds should be educated so as that they might be able to enter on long courses of action with a view to remote advantage as well as present gratification. But unfortunately the multitude are not educated at all; and therefore the apprehension of future punishment is altogether unable to restrain them from vice. Among men little accustomed to reason on the remote consequences of actions, the dread of future punishment has but little influence; and even in England, the land of Bibles and Prayer Books, it requires all the authority of the priesthood, all the low and vulgar machinery of religious tract societies; and all the influence of thousands of the initiated to keep the dread of *hell* alive in the public mind, so as that it may co-operate with the strong arm of government in preserving peace and decorum. The strong and powerful motives to crime which the condition of the multitude furnishes often neutralize this influence, and as a consequence crime is committed. Besides natural self-love induces every man to make an exception in relation to future torment in favour of himself. Scarcely any man, except he be under the influence of religious melancholy, believes that he is destined to go to hell himself, although he will most heartily subscribe to the doctrine which asserts that "broad is the way to everlasting destruction and many there be that walk therein." Thus the influence which under other circumstances a belief in the dogma of future punishment might exercise over man, is neutralized and prevented. On the other hand the people, if educated, would think for themselves; and this would lead we apprehend to the renunciation of the dogma altogether. Thus whether the people be educated or uneducated, a belief in future punishment is of little service to the cause of morality.

When the Spaniards were desirous of oppressing the Aborigines of America, they represented the native tribes as excessively stupid, as exceedingly barbarous, and as essentially indolent. No doubt they were both barbarous and stupid; but that they were so essentially, and without possibility of improvement, is a doctrine the truth of which never has been nor ever can be proved. This however was merely a pretext, under colour of which the Spaniards might with some show of justice perpetrate the direst enormities on the American Indians. Accordingly they laboured with untiring assiduity to impress this notion on the public mind in Europe. An experiment was tried in one of the Spanish settlements which was held to be decisive as to the character of the natives. A few Indians were allotted a piece of land; and because that simple people did not cultivate it so as to produce for themselves the necessaries of life, they were considered incapable of civilization. The Spaniards accordingly oppressed and ultimately exterminated them. So has it been with the people and the priesthood. The priesthood have

tried their plan of renovating humanity; and, finding it unsuccessful, they have pronounced the human heart "deceitful above all things and desperately wicked." And, moreover, they have made this a pretext, under colour of which they might establish the credit of their order and secure to themselves emoluments which flow from the exertions of the people. "O what would this human heart, so deceitful and so wicked, be, were it not restrained by the influence and preaching of the ministers of the gospel." This is the cry of every priest—the warwhoop of the sacerdotal order; and as they have continued to make the people believe that endless misery would attend the destruction of their order, they consequently have secured to themselves rich benefices, high honours, and sounding titles, and a large share of the property of the country.

O how strong and beautiful is humanity to stand up and exhibit any thing of its native dignity under the wear and tear of machinery like this! Yet we frequently behold the exhibition of kindness, and humanity, and noble-mindedness on the part of human beings, notwithstanding all the deteriorating influences which operate upon them, which gives the lie direct to the priestly slander respecting the essential vileness and depravity of our nature.

How could the human heart be good, how could human actions be always virtuous, considering the treatment humanity has received? Has not the priesthood done all in its power to prevent the march of mind, to stop the diffusion of knowledge among the people? Has not that order been ready to manacle the philosopher whenever he attempted to teach the people scientific truth, to imprison and burn the heretic whenever he attempted to gainsay their authority, and overturn long established prejudices and time-hallowed institutions? Have not the self-styled ambassadors of Christ been the foes of free inquiry in all ages and in all countries? And do they not at the present time call into requisition all the art, and skill, and power, they possess to keep the people in a state of ignorance, lest they should discover the cheat which has been practised upon them for centuries? Do they not in the present day slander and villify the personal character of those who have the moral courage to publicly renounce their dogmas, and proclaim in a strain of high and incontrovertible argument their fallacy to the world? Do not the priests, in conjunction with their votaries, endeavour to do personal injury to Infidels—all the injury which the law permits—that of starving them into submission? Have they not sent a man about the country to endeavour to procure the discharge of peaceable mechanics and workmen—not for the committal of crime against the laws of the state—not for immoral conduct or unamiable dispositions, but for the damning sin in the eyes of the priesthood—*non-belief in their doctrines*? Have they not sanctioned and caressed their agent; given him testimonials as to character and abilities; and subscribed a part of the money they drew from the people to support him in his career of infamy? What then is this but a crusade against opinion; a puny attempt to stop the growing intelligence of the age; which not only marks the vileness of the instrument employed for the purpose, but the character of the body which lends him its sanction? Yet these are the instructors of mankind! the ministers of God's honour and truth!! the props of religion, and the teachers of morality!!! the sick man's comfort, and the poor man's hope!!!! the ambassadors of Christ, and the curse of the people!!!!

If the priesthood were really desirous of emancipating man from misery

and bondage, would they not concur in those measures which appear likely to effect it. If they were friendly to the diffusion of intelligence, would they not endeavour to instruct the people in scientific truth? We will not attempt to say that this is not done in particular cases; but these cases constitute the exception, not the rule. We do not charge every member of the priestly order with the vices which pertain to the body; but we say that those who are not chargeable with those vices, are few, contrasted with those who are. There are no doubt many sincere, upright, and noble-minded men among the priesthood; but the splendour of their virtues, the celebrity of their talents, and the nobleness of the exertions they make for the public weal, are not sufficient to throw a halo of light and beauty around the order to which they belong, sufficient to screen from public view its natural deformity. But the reign of priestly power is drawing towards its termination! the sun of sacerdotal splendour is setting never to rise again!

The present age is distinguished by a bold and restless spirit of enquiry into religious as well as all other matters. Political measures, which formerly were kept in the Cabinets of Statesmen until they issued forth to the people in the shape of compulsory edicts, are now subjected to the tribunal of public criticism; and the *vox populi* has a very great influence either in preventing them from passing into laws, or in modifying them in course of their passage through the legislature. Religion, which was formerly considered a sacred thing which the people were to receive by faith, is now submitted to the test of reason; and either embraced or rejected, as the arguments advanced in support of its claims appear strong or weak to the individual. Scientific truth is now eagerly sought after; and the want of a more extensive knowledge of nature is felt throughout society. Though there is much to be regretted and deplored in the present condition of the working classes, there is nevertheless much to encourage the philanthropist in his endeavours to better their condition and remove their burdens. Society seems on the eve of some mighty and important crisis; some peaceful and bloodless revolution. The enormous increase of scientific power, with the depression of wages, and the consequent misery of the workman, however heart-rending it may appear at present, augurs well for future ages. The mass of the people are becoming intelligent, and beginning to perceive that all power resides in their hands. As soon as they perceive this more fully, and at the same time become intelligent enough to exercise this power properly, they will combine their exertions for the removal of physical suffering, and for the establishment of those institutions whence shall spring peace, and plenty, and happiness.


In visions I beheld the thrones and potentates of the earth gathered into one place, and the spiritual hierarchies were there. They had confederated for the purpose of restraining the people from acquiring knowledge, and from obtaining their rights as men. Suddenly there was a sound of distant thunder, and the earth opened and swallowed up the thrones and the potentates, and the spiritual hierarchies, and immediately closed again. And the people were left free; and they spread themselves over the face of the earth, and began to till the soil, and to enjoy the fruits of their labour. The thrones had disappeared; the priests had sunk into the earth; but virtue flourished and plenty abounded among the people. I saw them happy, and, rejoicing, awoke.







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